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CHOICES ABOUT ATTORNEY FEE-SHIFTING LAWS:
FURTHER SUBSTANCE/PROCEDURE PROBLEMS
UNDER ERIE AND ELSEWHEREt
Jeffrey A. Parness*
Increasing numbers of statutes and court rules either permit or mandate the shifting of
attorney's fees during civil litigation. The erosions on the American Rule that each litigant
should pay his own fees are often founded on differing rationales suggesting that the laws may
be characterized as either substantive or procedural. In this Article, Professor Parness asserts
that characterization is important in three settings: a case involving the Erie doctrine, a case
involving a state court's choice between the conflicting laws of at least two states, and a situa-
tion involving separation of powers concerns over whether the legislature or the judiciary has
lawmaking responsibility.
Professor Parness argues that the failure to differentiate between substantive and proce-
duralfee-shifing laws, especially in the Erie setting, springs in large part from a misunder-
standing of Supreme Court precedents, particularly the dicta in footnote 31 in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. He concludes that properly read, the rulings
suggest that fee-shifting laws related to conduct triggering a cause of action are usually sub-
stantive, while fee-shifting laws related to conduct during litigation are typically procedural.
Fee-shifting laws related to conduct surrounding the commencement of a lawsuit may be
either substantive or procedural depending on their purpose
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INTRODUCTION
A long standing legal principle in the United States is win or lose,
a litigant should pay his own attorney's fees. This principle, relatively
unique among industrialized democracies, is known as the "American
Rule."1 An increasing number of statutes2 and court rules3 that
either permit or mandate fee-shifting in particular instances have sub-
stantially eroded this rule. Courts and legislatures have identified at
least three rationales for the growing number of exceptions to the
American Rule. First, fee-shifting laws help to deter misconduct dur-
ing civil litigation. Second, fee-shifting laws encourage meritorious
civil actions that might not otherwise be commenced. Third, fee-
shifting laws promote the settlement of civil disputes without litiga-
tion.4 Given these differing rationales, a court may characterize a fee-
shifting provision as either procedural or substantive. 5 This distinc-
tion between procedural and substantive laws is especially important
1. Roe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651,
651.
2. A recent survey revealed 1,974 attorney fee-shifting statutes in the codes of the 50 states and
the District of Columbia. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 323 (1984).
3. With court rules, there has been an explosion in fee-shifting opportunities based on frivolous
litigation papers which was triggered by the 1983 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See, e.g., 10TH
CIR. R. 3.1; ARiz. R. Civ. P. 11(a); Ky. R. Civ. P. 11; MICH. CT. R. 2.114(D), 2.114(E); MINN. R.
Civ. P. 11; Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03; MoNT. R. Civ. P. 11; N.C. R. Civ. P. 11; UTAH R. APP. P. 40.
4. Leubsdorf, Toward History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
5. Note, supra note 2, at 329. The commentator classifies state attorney fee-shifting statutes
into two general groups: (1) procedural or general litigation statutes, and (2) nonprocedural statutes.
Since the primary purpose of general litigation statutes is to discourage abuse of the judicial process
rather than to protect certain parties, beneficiaries of these procedural fee-shifting statutes tend to be
identified as "aggrieved party, prevailing moving party, or prevailing party." Id. at 331-32. Non-
procedural statutes, on the other hand, seek to protect certain parties and therefore tend to identify
the beneficiary as "prevailing plaintiff, prevailing defendant, or prevailing specific party." Id. at 332.
In addition to the different objectives, the commentator notes another difference between procedural
and nonprocedural fee-shifting statutes:
[O]nly 29% of state attorney fee [statutes] have any standard to follow. Nevertheless, with
respect to those statutes with standards, two items merit note. First, bad faith and substan-
tial justification standards are confined mostly to general litigation statutes. In contrast,
condition precedent and knowing or willful standards are the most common standards for
nonprocedural attorney fee shifting statutes.
Id. at 333. See Comment, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 698 (1939-
1940). The commentator recognizes the procedural nature of fee-shifting provisions designed to
discourage frivolous or bad faith suits:
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when one of three questions arises. One question is whether, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, a fee-shifting statute or rule is
valid. The answer usually lies in the division of responsibilities for
lawmaking between courts and legislatures. Another question is
whether, in choosing among conflicting state laws, a state court
should defer to the fee-shifting provision of another state. The answer
implicates the dimensions of full faith and credit. The final question is
whether a federal court sitting as a state court should give effect to a
state fee-shifting law. The answer requires a recognition of the divi-
sion of responsibilities between federal and state governments. While
this Article chiefly focuses on the last question, its analysis has signifi-
cance for the others.
Following the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 6 federal
courts entertaining state law claims generally apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law. This result promotes uniformity in
the definition of state substantive law, while promoting uniformity in
the procedural means by which federal courts enforce all claims.
Although not all fee-shifting laws fall within the definition of state
substantive law, a number of lower federal courts hearing state law
claims have applied state fee-shifting laws without undertaking any
substance/procedure analysis.7 This failure to recognize the distinc-
tion between substantive and procedural fee-shifting provisions has
resulted in two troubling and related consequences: (1) federal courts
have occasionally applied state procedural laws which the states never
intended federal courts to apply, or which should not govern in a fed-
eral court because of the state's relatively small interest in the conduct
of federal litigation; and (2) federal courts have failed to give effect to
significant federal procedural law interests in fee-shifting.
Many of these lower federal court decisions have resulted from
some unfortunate language employed by the United States Supreme
Court when it addressed the issue of federal court deference to state
fee-shifting laws. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
The theory that one bringing a frivolous action or an action in bad faith should be
punished has its roots far back in legal history. The Athenian who unjustly accused a
citizen of an offence against the state was fined if he failed to secure the votes of one-fifth of
all the judges. Many procedural penalties were likewise recognized in civil cases by the
Roman jurists.
Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
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ety, 8 the Supreme Court observed in footnote 31 that federal courts, in
diversity cases, usually should apply a state fee-shifting law when it
reflects a substantial policy of the state.9 Lower federal courts sitting
in diversity have often interpreted footnote 31 to require them to ap-
ply all state fee-shifting laws. l° However, a closer examination of the
substance/procedure dichotomy in fee-shifting laws,1" early Supreme
Court decisions on the use of state fee-shifting policies in federal court
lawsuits, 12 and the Supreme Court's use of authority in footnote 3113
reveals that this interpretation is incorrect. Upon review it is appar-
ent that the Supreme Court's language in footnote 31 is consistent
with Erie and commands that federal courts hearing state law claims
only apply state substantive fee-shifting laws. This language also sug-
gests that state courts entertaining the substantive law claims of other
states need only apply the substantive fee-shifting laws of those other
states, and that many state courts possessing rulemaking powers may
only promulgate procedural fee-shifting provisions.
In Part I, this Article will demonstrate that attorney fee-shifting
laws may be characterized as either substantive or procedural in at
least three settings, including cases governed by the decision in Erie.
In Part II, this Article will examine lower federal court decisions that
have applied footnote 31 and will demonstrate that these courts have
not recognized the different characterizations of fee-shifting laws. Fi-
nally, in Part III, the Article will conclude by urging federal courts
and others to be more sensitive to the substance/procedure dichotomy
when they make choices about attorney fee-shifting laws.
I. THE SUBSTANCE/PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY
IN FEE-SHIFTING LAWS
Some attorney fee-shifting laws are substantive and others are
procedural.14 The differences are important when federal courts must
choose between federal and state laws in a diversity setting, when
state courts must choose between their own laws and foreign laws in
8. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
9. Id. at 259 n.31. For full quotation of footnote 31 in Alyeska, see infra text accompanying
notes 108-10.
10. See infra notes 111-28.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See supra note 5.
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Full Faith and Credit15 and Supremacy Clause 16 settings, and when
legislatures and courts must choose the appropriate lawmakers in a
separation of powers setting. Courts and legislatures should typically
base the distinctions between substantive and procedural fee-shifting
laws on whether the fee-shifting laws are intimately tied to claims or
causes of action permitted under substantive laws or whether they are
tied to the judicial processes available for resolving disputes about
claims or causes of action. The Supreme Court recognized the dis-
tinction in Marek v. Chesny,17 a case involving the relationship be-
tween one Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Federal Rule or rule),
rule 68,18 and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197619
(section 1988).
Rule 68 provides that if a complaining party rejects a settlement
offer, and the judgment finally obtained is no greater than the amount
offered, the complaining party must pay the costs incurred after the
offer was made. The term "costs" is not defined in the rule. The
purpose of this procedural rule is "to encourage settlement and avoid
litigation. '2o
Section 1988 provides that a prevailing party in an action
brought pursuant to section 198321 or certain other civil rights laws
15. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1.
16. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 68 states:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for
the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not ac-
cepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a pro-
ceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the
offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order of
judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall have
the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less
than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of
liability.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides, in part, that in any action to enforce § 1983, the court
may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs.
20. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5, 10. Incidentally, there is no corresponding responsibility for a de-
fending party who is found liable for more than the amount in a pretrial offer by the complainant.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides, in part: "Every person who, under color of any statute
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has the right to seek attorney's fees as part of the costs. One legisla-
tive goal of section 1988 is to encourage plaintiffs to bring meritorious
civil rights suits so that the relevant civil rights laws may be more
fully enforced. Another goal is to deter plaintiffs from bringing frivo-
lous civil rights actions. 22
In Marek, plaintiff brought a section 1983 suit in federal district
court. Defendants made a pretrial settlement offer of $100,000, which
plaintiff rejected. At trial the jury awarded plaintiff $60,000. Pursu-
ant to section 1988, plaintiff requested attorney's fees. Defendants ar-
gued that, under rule 68, plaintiff was not entitled to certain fees since
plaintiff's attorney's fees for trial were a part of the rule 68 costs that
plaintiff was required to pay.2
3
In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the
Supreme Court noted that the drafters of rule 68 were aware of the
federal statutes allowing for attorney's fees as part of costs in particu-
lar cases, 24 and that the drafters did not define the term costs as used
in rule 68.25 The Court declared, "[A]bsent Congressional expres-
sions to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines 'costs' to
include attorney's fees ... such fees are to be included as costs for
purposes of Rule 68."26 In denying plaintiff post-offer costs, including
the ability to recover attorney's fees incurred after the settlement of-
fer, the Court remarked, "Section 1988 encourages plaintiffs to bring
meritorious civil rights suits; Rule 68 simply encourages settlements.
There is nothing incompatible in these two objectives."' 27 The Court
thus determined that substantive and procedural fee-shifting laws
could coexist. Unlike the appellate court,28 the Supreme Court found
that including attorney's fees as nonrecoverable costs under rule 68
did not alter a substantive policy in contravention of the Rules En-
... of any State... subjects... any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights
... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ...."
22. Marek, 473 U.S. at 10; S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908. While encouragement of this kind is intimately tied with the
enforcement of the civil rights law sued upon, this deterrence is more closely related to the operation
of the judicial system wherein the claim is raised. Thus, the award of fees to prevailing complainants
depends only upon their success since the reasonableness of their opponents' litigation activities is
irrelevant, while the award of fees to prevailing defendants depends upon the litigation misconduct
of complaining parties.
23. Marek, 473 U.S. at 3-4.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9 & n.2.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
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abling Act,29 which disallows procedural rules from enlarging, modi-
fying or abridging any substantive right.30 This was true even though,
in the absence of rule 68, attorney's fees were recoverable by the
plaintiff under civil rights law.
The Marek decision illustrates that, in a separation of powers
setting, a procedural law rule promulgated by a court may dictate
attorney's fee allowances without contravening a substantive law right
passed by a legislature. This general recognition of the availability of
procedural fee-shifting laws initiated by courts with rulemaking
power, although contrary to the results achieved when courts only
consider substantive fee-shifting laws passed by legislatures, is equally
applicable to settings involving a choice of law by a state court and
the Erie doctrine. In all three settings, the substance/procedure di-
chotomy must be explored before there can be choices or adoption of
fee-shifting provisions.
Marek demonstrates that, in a case with two relevant fee-shifting
laws, one may be substantive and one may be procedural. It further
evidences that the two different forms of fee-shifting laws may operate
harmoniously in the same case. Beyond Marek, there are instances
when a court can characterize a single fee-shifting provision as either
substantive or procedural, depending upon the setting in which a
court considers its use. City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 31 illustrates the dual characterizations attending some fee-
shifting laws. The controversy in Carter Lake involved a diversity
claim in a Nebraska federal court between Iowa and Nebraska con-
cerns. Specifically, an insured sought payment under an insurance
policy that was governed by Iowa law. In addition, the insured
sought reimbursement of attorney's fees as provided by a Nebraska
statute.32 Without articulating its reasoning, the federal court con-
cluded that, for Erie purposes, the issue of granting or denying attor-
ney's fees to the insured was a question of substantive law, and
therefore state law, not federal law, controlled.33 Sitting as a Ne-
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), quoted in part infra note 168.
30. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. Compare id. at 36-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 1062. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-359 (1974) generally provided that an uninsured who
succeeds in obtaining a judgment is to be awarded attorney's fees. Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1052.
33. Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1062 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941)). But see State See. Ins. Co. v. White, 498 F. Supp. 873, 874 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (recognizing
that fee-shifting laws should not always be deemed substantive in an Erie setting), aff'd without op.,
667 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1982).
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braska state court, the federal court then looked to Nebraska's ap-
proach to fee-shifting statutes involving insurance companies to
determine whether Iowa or Nebraska law governed. 34 If the statute
was substantive, Iowa law would control;35 if procedural, Nebraska
law would control. 36 The federal court examined Nebraska case law
and determined that Nebraska characterized its fee-shifting statute as
procedural and thus concluded that the Nebraska law controlled.37
Accordingly, the federal court considered the Nebraska provision as
substantive under Erie, but as procedural in a choice of state law
setting.
In a somewhat different sense, a single fee-shifting law may be
both substantive and procedural. Consider section 1988, the civil
rights statute involved in Marek. In the lower court,3 8 the judges
remarked:
Although the right to attorney's fees created by section 1988 is in one
sense not "substantive" but "procedural," because it governs the rela-
tions between the parties to a lawsuit, in another sense it is more "sub-
stantive" than "procedural." It does not make the litigation process
more accurate and efficient for both parties .... [I]t is designed instead
to achieve a substantive objective--compliance with the civil rights laws
.... But no doubt the right is better described as both substantive and
procedural, or as substantive for some purposes and procedural for
others.
39
The court's remarks were appropriate because under section 1988 a
prevailing complainant can recover fees regardless of the accuracy
34. Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1062.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court relied upon Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623
(1951). In Hawkeye, in the context of deciding a conflict of state law question, the Nebraska
Supreme Court stated that "the authority to allow attorney's fees is procedural though in part con-
trolled by statute." Hawkeye, 48 N.W.2d at 634. Of course, a state's characterization of a fee provi-
sion as substantive or procedural in such a setting should not be dispositive on the characterization
of the state law for Erie purposes. Rather, the determination of whether a certain state law applies
when a federal court hears a state law claim should be made only after consideration of the state's
policies underlying its law "and their relation to accommodating the policy of the Erie rule with
Congress' power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
38. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
39. Id. at 479. While a prevailing plaintiff's right to recover fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982) is substantive (as meritorious civil rights actions are encouraged), a prevailing defendant's




and efficiency of the litigation process,4° but a prevailing defendant
can only recover fees if the complainant engages in significant litiga-
tion misconduct.41 Consequently, the statute embodies substantive
civil rights law when used by a complainant, but procedural law on
abusive litigation conduct when used by a defendant.
Accordingly, fee-shifting laws may be either procedural or sub-
stantive. Procedural fee-shifting laws typically govern conduct during
litigation, often by permitting recovery of fees from those who abuse
the judicial process. Substantive fee-shifting laws typically relate to
the remedies available for certain claims, often encouraging assertions
of these claims by providing that prevailing complainants are entitled
to recovery of fees. Marek illustrates that a court can harmonize dif-
fering procedural and substantive fee-shifting laws. Carter Lake dem-
onstrates that a court can characterize a single fee-shifting law as
either procedural or substantive, depending upon the setting. Finally,
section 1988 shows that a single fee-shifting law can contain both pro-
cedural and substantive law elements. Consequently, courts must
closely examine fee-shifting laws, especially when they must choose
from a variety of laws or make choices about the proper lawmaker.
While the substance/procedure dichotomy is significant in
choosing from a variety of fee-shifting laws urged in a number of set-
tings, and is even significant in applying a single fee-shifting law, the
focus herein is fee-shifting in the Erie context. This Article argues
that the policies of the Erie doctrine are fully applicable when federal
courts must determine whether a particular fee provision should be
given effect. Thus, in granting or denying a fee request under a state
law, federal courts in the Erie setting must closely examine the state
law and the implications surrounding its use. Bright line tests are
inappropriate. As Justice Rutledge once noted:
[I]n many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that ra-
tional separation becomes well-nigh impossible. But, even so, this fact
cannot dispense with the necessity of making a distinction. For, as the
matter stands, it is Congress which has the power to govern the proce-
dure of the federal courts in diversity cases, and the states which have
that power over matters clearly substantive in nature.42
Unfortunately, many lower federal courts have failed to undertake a
40. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412,
421 (1978).
41. Id.
42. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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careful investigation of state and federal policies when fee-shifting
laws clash in an Erie setting. Swayed by some unfortunate ambiguity
in the Supreme Court's dicta in footnote 31 in Alyeska, many federal
courts hearing state law claims have applied state,-fee-shifting provi-
sions without analyzing their substantive or procedural nature.
43
Proper analysis of this substance/procedure dichotomy requires fed-
eral courts to distinguish between certain fee-shifting laws tied to va-
rying claims, including those involving civil rights and insurance, and
other fee-shifting laws tied to the judicial processes for resolving
claims, including those involving pleading and motion practice. Such
distinctions are necessary not only in an Erie setting, but also in set-
tings involving state court choices between competing state laws and
in settings involving choices about lawmakers when the legislature
and courts share responsibility.
II. THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Alyeska
Before considering the Supreme Court's dicta in footnote 31 in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society44 and its unfortu-
nate consequences, this Article first briefly examines earlier Supreme
Court decisions. These cases are useful in approaching footnote 31
and in understanding its ramifications. The decisions suggest that,
when sitting as state courts, federal courts need only apply state fee-
shifting laws which are substantive, that is, the ones closely tied to the
state laws on which the claims for relief are founded.
In 1928, in Sioux County, Nebraska v. National Surety Co.,45 the
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether federal courts, in di-
versity cases, should enforce a state statute providing for the allow-
ance of attorney's fees as costs, or whether the federal statutes which
excluded these fees from permissible costs precluded such recovery.
46
A Nebraska statute mandated the allowance of attorney's fees "to be
taxed as part of the costs" to a successful plaintiff in an action to
recover on an insurance policy. 47 In applying the state statute, the
Court distinguished between attorney's fees as costs and costs in the
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 102-10.
45. 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
46. Id. at 243-44 (R.S. §§ 823, 824 dealing with the small fees of court officers, attorney's
docket fees and the like, are now found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1982)).
47. Id. at 242 n.2 (citing NEB. COMP. STAT. § 7811 (1922)).
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ordinary sense. The Court viewed the allowance of attorney's fees as
a state statutory right and concluded that federal courts should en-
force such an allowance, not by taxing the amount as costs, but by
including the attorney's fee in the judgment. The Court reasoned that
such an allowance did not constitute costs in the ordinary sense, and
therefore, the fees were not within the field of costs covered by federal
statute.48 The Court remarked:
Disregarding mere matters of form it is clear that it is the policy of the
state to allow plaintiffs to recover an attorney's fee in certain cases, and it
has made the policy effective by making the allowance of the fee
mandatory on its courts in those cases. It would be at least anomalous if
this policy could be thwarted and the right so plainly given destroyed by
removal of the cause to the federal courts.
4 9
This statement, often quoted by federal courts in later Erie cases,
is an early source of the misunderstanding regarding the applicability
of state fee-shifting laws in federal courts. Some courts have broadly
interpreted the language in Sioux County as mandating that federal
courts give effect to all state fee-shifting laws. Yet, a review of cases
involving fee-shifting laws in an insurance context, as occurred in
Sioux County,50 demonstrates that such a broad interpretation is inap-
propriate. Judge Strum, in Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire Fire
Insurance Co.,51 recognized that the liability imposed upon an insurer
by a statute like that involved in Sioux County "is in effect an incident
to the insurer's wrongful refusal to pay, not a mere procedural inci-
dent to the entry of judgment. '52 The judge reasoned that such a
statute "in effect becomes a part of the contract, because the parties
contract subject to the terms of the statute. ' 53 Furthermore, it is sig-
nificant to note that, in Sioux County, the Supreme Court's concern
focused on preserving the insured's unfettered state law right to com-
pensation for attorney's fees and not on the insured's right to be com-
pensated at the court's discretion for certain costs associated with
litigation.5 4 Although the Court in Sioux County did not expressly
characterize this right as substantive, the district court in Orlando ex-
48. Id. at 243-44. Of course, several years later the Court's reasoning would have been guided
by its decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. Sioux County, 276 U.S. at 243.
50. Id.
51. 51 F.2d 392 (D. Fla. 1931).
52. Id. at 393.
53. Id.
54. Sioux County, 276 U.S. at 243-44.
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plained the nature of an insured's right to compensation for attorney's
fees as follows:
The statute imposes a liability for ... delinquency on the part of an
insurer in the payment of its obligation. A corresponding right of recov-
ery necessarily arises in favor of the beneficiary. The right thus created
... is a substantive right .... The parties having contracted with refer-
ence to the statute, the substantive right clearly exists in a prevailing
plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees.55
Thus, courts can only interpret Sioux County as requiring federal
courts hearing state law claims to apply state substantive (contract or
insurance) laws on fee-shifting and not all state fee-shifting laws.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
also elaborated on the protective policies furthered by fee-shifting
laws on behalf of an insured. In Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Tire &
Casualty,56 the West Virginia court considered the state common law
right to attorney's fees for prevailing complainants in property dam-
age insurance claims. The court observed the following: (1) both pol-
icy holders and third-party creditors rely upon an insured's policy;
(2) an insurance company is in a superior bargaining position to the
insured; and (3) when an insured's property, whether his residence or
commercial structure, is destroyed, he has an urgent need to rebuild. 57
On the latter point the court stated, "In the case of a business, lack of
immediate rebuilding may cost the company a significant portion of
its skilled employees and may cause employees the loss of their jobs,
pensions, and seniority. ' 58 After acknowledging the American Rule,
the court stated, "[I]n the absence of a statutory or contractual provi-
sion providing for such recovery, attorneys' fees may not be recovered
in an action on an insurance policy."' 59 The court reaffirmed West
Virginia's agreement with other jurisdictions which recognize the role
of fee-shifting in promoting prompt payments of insurance.60 In addi-
tion, the court established a bright line test, deeming the insurer's
good or bad faith either before or after litigation as irrelevant. It de-
clared, "After all, the insurer had contracted to defend the insured,
and it failed to do so. It guessed wrong as to its duty, and should be
55. Orlando, 51 F.2d at 393. Judge Strum's opinion pre-dated the decision in Erie.
56. 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
57. Id. at 77.
58. Id. at 77-78.
59. Id. at 78 (citing 22A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 14533 (Appleman
ed. 1979); 15A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 58:124 (Rhodes ed. 1983)).
60. Id. at 79.
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compelled to bear the consequences thereof. ' 61 Noting that a policy
holder buys insurance, not a vexatious or expensive lawsuit, the Hay-
seeds court remarked that when an insurer breaches its contractual
duty to defend its insured, it should be compelled to compensate the
insured for all expenses resulting from the breach of contract. 62
The opinion in Sioux County is consistent with Orlando and Hay-
seeds. The Sioux County Court asserted that a statutory liability for
paying attorney's fees, which is an incident of one party's wrongful
refusal to perform an obligation owed to the other party and not a
mere procedural incident to the entry of the judgment, gives rise to a
corollary substantive right to the recovery of attorney's fees incurred
in the enforcement of that obligation.63 Implicit in this assertion is
that a liability to compensate an opponent for his attorney's fees,
which is imposed merely as a procedural incident to the entry of judg-
ment, does not give rise to a substantive right although it creates a
corresponding right of recovery.
Thus, Sioux County recognizes that a fee-shifting law creates a
liability to compensate and a corresponding right to receive compen-
sation. In determining the applicability of a particular fee-shifting
law in an Erie setting, the pre-Erie decision in Sioux County directs
federal courts to focus on the nature of the liability that the fee-shift-
ing law imposes. Federal courts must consider whether the fee-shift-
ing law imposes liability merely as a procedural device, thus creating
as an incident a corresponding right to recover fees, or whether the
liability goes beyond procedural concerns and creates in the prevailing
party a substantive right to compensation. Sioux County requires ap-
plication of only state fee-shifting laws which impose liabilities that
are not merely incidental to the management of adjudication. Ac-
cordingly, federal courts hearing state law claims should only apply
state fee-shifting laws which are substantive.
Five years after Sioux County, the Supreme Court, in Missouri
State Life Insurance Co. v. Jones,64 considered whether the allowance
of attorney's fees should be included as part of the amount in contro-
versy needed to remove a diversity case to federal district court. An
Arkansas statute allowed attorney's fees to persons seeking to collect
61. Id. (quoting 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4691, at 282-83
(Berdal ed. 1979)).
62. Id. The Hayseeds court noted that insureds could also recover punitive damages if the
insurer maliciously intended to injure or defraud the insured. Id. at 80.
63. Sioux County, Neb. v. National Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928).
64. 290 U.S. 199 (1933).
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payments under insurance policies. 65 The state court had denied re-
moval, ruling that the Arkansas statute required attorney's fees to be
taxed as costs and that costs were not computed in valuing the matter
in controversy. 66 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on Sioux
County for two propositions: first, a state statute permitting attor-
ney's fees as costs creates a liability which is enforceable in a federal
court; and second, although the statute characterizes the allowance as
costs, the characterization does not affect the nature of liability.
6 7
Although this broad language might urge the conclusion that all state
statutes permitting attorney's fees as costs are enforceable in a federal
court, this conclusion is not correct. The Court, in Missouri State,
further declared:
In the state court the present respondent sought to enforce the liability
imposed by statutefor his benefit-to collect something to which the law
gave him a right. The amount so demanded became part of the matter
put in controversy by the complaint, and not mere "costs" excluded from
the reckoning by the jurisdictional and removal statutes. 68
Thus, the Court expressly acknowledged that the statute imposed lia-
bility for the benefit of the insured. This liability was unrelated to any
litigation activity. The liability was not a mere procedural incident to
the entry of the judgment under Sioux County; rather, it constituted a
part of state substantive insurance law.
In 1949, the Supreme Court, in an Erie setting, confronted a
New Jersey statute69 that required certain unsuccessful plaintiffs in
65. The statute stated:
In all cases where loss occurs, and the fire, life, health, or accident insurance company
liable therefor shall fail to pay the same within the time specified in the policy, after de-
mand made therefor, such company shall be liable to pay the holder of such policy, in
addition to the amount of such loss, twelve per cent damages upon the amount of such loss,
together with all reasonable attorneys' fees for the prosecution and collection of said loss;
said attorneys' fees to be taxed by the court where the same is heard on original action, by
appeal or otherwise and to be taxed up as part of the costs therein and collected as other
costs are or may be by law collected.
Id. at 200 (quoting Crawford & Moses' Digest, Statutes of Arkansas § 6155).
66. Id. at 201. Of course, today state courts have no power to rule on the propriety of removal
from state to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982).
67. Missouri State, 290 U.S. at 202.
68. Id. (emphasis added). This language was seemingly properly applied in Batts Restaurant,
Inc. v. Commercial Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1969) (utilizing act which permitted fees
against an insurer who refused to pay in order to establish jurisdictional amount) and was misapplied
in Velez v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1979) (utilizing state laws allowing fees
against defendants who refuse to settle any claim in order to calculate amount in controversy for
federal jurisdictional purposes).
69. The statute stated:
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shareholder derivative suits to pay the defending corporation's rea-
sonable defense expenses, including attorney's fees. The statute fur-
ther required these plaintiffs to give security for any such future
payments as a prerequisite to bringing the action. The Court, in Co-
hen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,70 held that the statute should
be enforced.71 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, reasoned that
a shareholder commencing a derivative suit "is a self-chosen represen-
tative and a volunteer champion" 72 of all the shareholders, and as
such, "assumes a position.., of a fiduciary character. ' 73 Further-
more, Justice Jackson argued that fiduciary litigation is extremely sus-
ceptible to regulation 74 and "that the state has plenary power over
this type of litigation.175 In finding that the state has the power to
prohibit derivative suits if plaintiffs do not give security required by
state statute, Justice Jackson observed that the security requirement is
1. In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign
corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of voting trust certificates representing
shares, of such corporation having a total par value or stated capital value of less than five
per centum (5%) of the aggregate par value or stated capital value of all the outstanding
shares of such corporation's stock of every class . . . unless the shares or voting trust
certificates held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000.00), the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled,
at any stage of the proceeding before final judgement, to require the complainant or com-
plainants to give security for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be
incurred by it in connection with such action and by the other parties defendant in connec-
tion therewith for which it may become subject pursuant to law, its certificate of incorpora-
tion, its by-laws or under equitable principles, to which the corporation shall have recourse
in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of
such action. The amount of such security may thereafter, from time to time, be increased
or decreased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.
2. In any action, suit or proceeding brought or maintained in the right of a domestic
or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of voting trust certificates
representing shares, of such corporation, it must be made to appear that the complainant
was a shareholder or the holder of a voting trust certificate at the time of the transaction of
which he complains or that his share or voting trust certificate thereafter devolved upon
him by operation of law.
3. This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all such actions, suits or
proceedings now pending in which no final judgment has been entered, and to all future
actions, suits and proceedings.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544 n.l (1949) (quoting N.J. LAws 131 (cur-
rent version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (West Supp. 1987))).
70. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
71. Id. at 556.
72. Id. at 549.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id. at 550.
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a legitimate means of ensuring that unsuccessful plaintiffs can satisfy
any resulting liability for fees.
76
In response to the argument that the New Jersey statute was pro-
cedural, and therefore, inapplicable in federal court,77 Justice Jackson
suggested that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 7 and Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York,79 federal courts might be required to apply state proce-
dural law when the law does something more than regulate proce-
dure. 0 He then remarked that the New Jersey statute did more than
merely regulate procedure because it created a new liability-an un-
successful plaintiff in a derivative suit became accountable to the cor-
poration for its expenses. Justice Jackson found this liability to be
unusual and to transcend the payment of costs. The provision requir-
ing security added "meaning and value" to the liability requirement.8'
Hence, the Supreme Court determined that federal courts were unable
to disregard the New Jersey liability statute as procedural.
8 2
The Court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2383
concerning derivative actions did not preclude application of the New
76. Id. at 552, 556. Found comparable in an Erie setting was an Oregon statute seeking to
assure that costs assessed against nonresident or foreign defendants be paid (through establishment
of duties on the defendant's attorney). See In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Management, Inc., 812
F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555.
78. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
79. 326 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1945) (State statute of limitations was applicable in a federal diversity
suit in equity although a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 723, provided that "'the forms and modes of
proceeding in suits... of equity' would conform to the settled uses of courts of equity.").
80. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555 ("Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their
effect by regulating procedure.").
81. Id. at 556.
82. Id. This broad view of what is meant by substantive under the Erie doctrine has unfortu-
nately been interpreted by some courts to mean that all state rules which allow fee-shifting create a
substantive right which federal courts are to recognize, merely because the law "creates a new liabil-
ity." Thus, in Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Ramos, 357 F.2d 341 (Ist Cir. 1966), the court
upheld a grant of fees made pursuant to P.R. R. CiV. P. 44.4(D), which allowed assessment of
attorney's fees against a party who had been "obstinate" during litigation. Ramos, 357 F.2d at 342.
The court, citing Cohen, recognized rule 44.4(D) as "a matter of substantive right," though it failed
to articulate how the rule did more than merely regulate procedure. Id. See Betancourt v. J. C.
Penney Co., 554 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1977). Under Cohen, procedural rules intimately tied to the
ability to collect on the violation of substantive rights are distinguished from procedural rules having
little to do with the "meaning and value" of substantive rights. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556. Thus, the
Court in Cohen conceded that the Federal Rule on derivative actions would apply, though in conflict
with other state procedural laws, since matters covered therein had little to do with the liabilities
under New Jersey substantive law. Id.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. At the time, the rule required a stockholder's complaint to be verified
by oath, to show plaintiff's timely ownership of relevant stock, to demonstrate the lack of collusion
regarding jurisdiction, and to set forth facts demonstrating an attempt to secure relief from the
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Jersey statute in federal court. The provisions of the Federal Rule
simply required notice to parties and disclosure to the court. The
Court held that because the Federal Rule provisions "neither create
nor exempt from liabilities, a84 they do not conflict with the state stat-
ute, and thus, in accordance with Guaranty Trust, the state statute
should be applied.85 In other words, the New Jersey state law claim
brought as a derivative action would be governed by both New Jersey
statutes and federal procedural rules on derivative lawsuits.8
6
Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, expressed a narrower view of
what is meant by "substantive" under the Erie doctrine. While the
majority opinion perceived a substantive quality to the New Jersey
statute because it created "a new liability where none existed
before,"87 Justice Douglas found that the New Jersey statute only reg-
ulated the procedure for bringing a derivative suit and did not fall
within the Erie doctrine because it did not "define, qualify or delimit
the cause of action or otherwise relate to it."88 While Justice Douglas
disagreed with Justice Jackson's application of the Erie doctrine, he
seemingly did not dispute the majority's statement of principles.
In his dissent, Justice Rutledge noted that the Erie doctrine re-
quired federal courts to apply state common law and statutory law
"in determining matters of substantive law, in particular and apart
from procedural limitations upon its assertion-whether a cause of
action exists."8 9 He then observed that post-Erie decisions such as
Guaranty Trust had extended the Erie doctrine to the point of impair-
ing Congress' power to control litigation in federal courts.90 Justice
Rutledge continued by declaring that, in many instances, substance
corporation. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556. None of the rule provisions were found to conflict with the
state statute. Id. The relevant Federal Rule is now FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
84. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556.
85. Id. (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). The Court in Cohen noted
that state law should be applied by federal courts in diversity cases in all instances "except details
related to its own conduct of business." Id. at 555 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945)).
86. Presumably, only New Jersey derivative action law with a "substantive tinge" would apply.
Ia at 561 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). While such a categorization is often difficult, evidently a major-
ity in Cohen found that laws on attorney's fees and security for expenses regulated the relationships
between corporations and their shareholders and between a stockholder fiduciary and those whom
he represents, and did not regulate the conduct of litigation. Id. at 549-50.
87. Id. at 555.
88. Id. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas remarked that the New Jersey
statute neither added nor subtracted one iota from the cause of action. Id.
89. Id. at 558 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 559.
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and procedure had become so interwoven that it was difficult for
courts to make a distinction. However, Justice Rutledge argued that
the need to make the distinction existed nonetheless since, in Erie
cases, states have power over clearly substantive matters while Con-
gress has power over clearly procedural matters.91
Justice Rutledge proceeded by noting that the substance/proce-
dure distinction should not be made "mechanically by reference to
whether the state courts' doors are open or closed,... [but rather] by
a consideration of the policies which close them and their relation to
accommodating the policy of the Erie rule with Congress' power to
govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits."' 92 According to
Justice Rutledge, the Federal Rule should have governed the case be-
cause, even if the New Jersey statute created a right of recovery, the
state statute was more procedural than substantive as it controlled the
incidents of litigation more than the outcome of litigation. 93 For Jus-
tice Rutledge, the Federal Rule requirement that a plaintiff must aver
in his complaint that at the time of the transaction giving rise to the
derivative suit he was a shareholder, or that following the transaction
his share devolved by operation of law, was just as "substantive" as
the New Jersey requirement that certain plaintiffs in such suits give
security.94 If this were true, he reasoned, then "any automatic or
mechanical application of the substance-procedural dichotomy"
95
would likely foreclose Congress or the Supreme Court from creating a
limitation on diversity litigation, such as in the Federal Rule for
pleading claims and for sanctions-including attorney's fees-on vio-
lations thereof, since state law governed substantive matters. 96 He
concluded that, notwithstanding its substantive tinge, the Federal
Rule was valid and applicable because it was so "closely related to
procedural and other matters affecting litigation in federal courts"
97
and because the New Jersey law, even though it may have had a sub-
stantive aspect, was too closely related to the manner in which litiga-
tion was to be conducted. Justice Rutledge concluded that the state
law should not be permitted to infringe upon Congress' power to reg-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 560-61.






ulate modes and methods of conducting litigation in federal courts.98
Regardless of whether or not the Cohen majority correctly con-
cluded that the New Jersey fee-shifting law and the related security
requirement were sufficiently substantive to require enforcement by
federal courts, it is significant that this question formed the corner-
stone for each of the opinions in the case. No Justice assumed all
state fee-shifting laws would apply in an Erie setting. Justice Jackson
described a stockholder bringing a derivative action as a fiduciary of
his fellow stockholders.99 Thus, he perceived the state statute as effec-
tuating a goal beyond the arguably procedural objectives of protecting
corporations from "strike suits"-derivative suits brought to harass
and not to redress wrongs. 00 The statute imposed liability on a stock-
holder who brought a derivative suit and the Supreme Court regarded
this liability as an incident of the stockholder's breach of a fiduciary
duty to his fellow stockholders in undertaking action on their behalf.
Accordingly, liability was not merely a procedural device regulating
conduct between adversaries during litigation. Justice Rutledge
found that the state laws had a substantive tinge which was insuffi-
cient under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,10 t while Justice Douglas
found the state laws insufficiently related to the cause of action.
Consequently, federal courts may interpret the pre-Alyeska
Supreme Court decisions directing federal courts to apply various
state fee-shifting laws in an Erie setting as requiring them only to give
effect to state substantive fee-shifting laws. Not all state fee-shifting
laws must be enforced when federal courts entertain state law claims.
B. Footnote 31 in Alyeska
The foregoing cases comprised the major fee-shifting precedents
before the Supreme Court in 1975. They suggested that federal courts
hearing state law claims must apply many, but not all, state fee-shift-
98. Id. at 549. While Justice Rutledge's analysis has some appeal, ultimately his conclusion
seems wrong. The New Jersey statute on fees and security was meant to limit the enforcement
opportunities for specific causes of action of specific people long before litigation had begun, though
based on earlier instances of abuses by similar people. Id. at 548 (concern for "strike suits"). A
contemporary analogy may be found in states with procedural laws on pleading abuse covering all
forms of civil litigation and substantive laws protective of certain parties in certain types of lawsuits.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-611, 2-611.1, 2-622 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (the former concerns all
pleadings, the others only medical malpractice defendants whom the legislature determined should
not be easily sued).
99. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 549.
100. Id. at 548.
101. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ing laws. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in 1975 did not follow
these precedents.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 10 2 the
Supreme Court examined the propriety of an award of attorney's fees
based on the equitable powers of the federal courts and the theory
that the plaintiffs acted as a "private attorney general." 10 3 The Court
reviewed the American Rule and decided that Congress alone should
usually determine the circumstances and manner of awarding attor-
ney's fees. t°4 Consequently, judicial recognition of a private attorney
general exception to the American Rule would invade the province of
Congress. 0 5 Alluding to the few instances in which the Court permit-
ted fees to the prevailing party in the absence of statutory author-
ity,106 the Court stated that those exceptions were based upon the
inherent judicial authority to allow attorney's fees in specific instances
in the absence of a congressional prohibition. The Court declared,
however, that no such exception applied in the pending case.10 7 Be-
cause its conclusion occurred in a case involving a federal question,
rather than diversity jurisdiction, and because differentiations be-
tween federal and state law claims were crucial in determining re-
quests for attorney's fees, the Court elaborated on the distinction
between fee allowances in the two settings in footnote 31. In distin-
guishing federal courts entertaining federal law claims and federal
102. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
103. Id. at 241. Private environmental protection groups brought this suit in an attempt to
prevent construction of an oil pipeline. Although there was no applicable statute allowing an award
of attorney's fees, the court of appeals nevertheless determined that suit had been brought to vindi-
cate "important statutory rights of all citizens." Id. at 245 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495
F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). The Alyeska Court also determined that allowance of attorney's fees
would encourage private parties to seek enforcement of environmental protection laws. Id. at 245-
46.
104. Specific authority from Congress was usually required because fee-shifting laws were
found to involve conflicting public policy views and because there were no judicially manageable
standards for resolving such conflicts. Id. at 264 n.39.
105. Id. at 271.
106. Id. at 257-59. The Alyeska Court recognized the historic equitable power to allow a
trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in
addition to himself, to recover attorney's fees whether from the fund or property itself or directly
from the other parties who benefit, id. at 257 (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881));
the power to assess attorney's fees for the willful disobedience of a court order as part of the fine to
be levied on the defendant, id. at 258 (quoting Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S.
399, 426-28 (1923)); and the power to allow attorney's fees when a losing party has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Id. at 258-59 (citing F. D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
107. Id. at 259.
[Vol. 49:393
ATTORNEY FEE-SHIFTING LAWS
courts entertaining state law claims, the Court first cited secondary
authorities, including works by Professor James Moore and Stuart
Speiser:
A very different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a
diversity case. "[I]n an ordinary diversity case where the state law does
not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court, and usually it
will not, state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right
thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be
followed."108
The Alyeska Court, in footnote 31, next referred to its own cases
on federal court responsibility during the resolution of state law
claims, concluding with the last major case, Hanna v. Plumer :109
Prior to the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins this Court held that a
state statute requiring an award of attorneys' fees should be applied in a
case removed from the state courts to the federal courts: "[I]t is clear
that it is the policy of the state to allow plaintiffs to recover an attorney's
fee allowance of the fee mandatory on its courts in those cases. It would
be at least anomalous if this policy could be thwarted and the right so
plainly given destroyed by removal of the cause to the federal courts."
People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co. The limitations on the
awards of attorneys' fees by federal courts deriving from the 1853 Act
were found not to bar the award. We see nothing after Erie requiring a
departure from this result. See Hanna v. Plumer. The same would
clearly hold for a judicially created rule, although the question of the
proper rule to govern in awarding attorneys' fees in federal diversity
cases in the absence of state statutory authorization loses much of its
practical significance in light of the fact that most States follow the re-
strictive American rule.
110
108. Id. at 259 n.31 (quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[2], at 1712-13 (2d ed.
1974)).
109. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
110. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. (citations omitted). Incidentally, there are cases which
may not be based on diversity jurisdiction, but to which this should apply. These cases involve the
exercise of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. See, eg., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982). Federal courts generally acknowledge that the princi-
ples of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) apply to pendent and ancillary claims as well as to
claims in diversity. See Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also McGinty
v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 232 (Ist Cir. 1980) (stating that the same reasons for
giving effect to state laws in diversity cases apply to pendent jurisdiction cases); United States ex rel.
Garett v. Midwest Constr. Co., 619 F.2d 349, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing fees pursuant to
Texas law for a state claim removed and consolidated with the federal claim). Because pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction, like diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, involve somewhat fortuitous federal
court responsibility, the policies favoring uniformity and disfavoring forum shopping are important.
Therefore, state substantive laws regarding fee-shifting should govern pendent and ancillary claims.
But see Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 916 (D.N.J. 1976) (denial of
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C. The Misreading of Footnote 31 by Lower Courts
Lower federal courts have seriously misinterpreted footnote 31 in
Alyeska, as well as earlier Supreme Court cases, in determining which
state fee-shifting laws should govern in an Erie setting. They should
interpret the phrase in footnote 31, "state law ... which reflects a
substantial policy of the state," '111 to compel deference only to state
substantive law. Therefore, state laws on attorney's fees which are
procedural in nature are inapplicable in Erie cases. Lower federal
courts sitting as state courts should not utilize footnote 31 as author-
ity for applying all state fee-shifting laws in an Erie setting, but must
distinguish between substantive and procedural fee-shifting
provisions.
In misreading footnote 31, federal courts sitting as state courts
have occasionally applied state procedural fee-shifting laws. One type
of state procedural law on attorney's fees which federal courts have
applied in an Erie setting was exemplified by section 41 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act 112 (section 41). This statute permitted a party to
recover fees incurred as a result of false pleadings unreasonably made
by an opponent in bad faith.113 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered section 41 in Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co. 114 and
denied a request for attorney's fees. The court's denial was not based
upon a determination that section 41 was procedural and therefore
inapplicable in federal court. Indeed, the court drew no distinction
between state fee-shifting laws which do and do not reflect a substan-
tial policy of the state. Rather, the circuit court held that the district
court's findings did not indicate that the suit was brought unreasona-
attorney's fees under a substantive state law on ground that federal jurisdiction over the state claim
was pendent and not based on diversity).
111. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31.
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (1973) provided:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and in good faith, and found to be
untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses, actu-
ally incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reason-
able attorney's fee, to be summarily taxed by the court at trial.
With very recent amendments, the Illinois law now substantially conforms to FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (1973).
114. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Manta v. Tryforos, 423 U.S. 1091
(1976). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also considered § 41 in Royal Indem. Co. v. Kenny
Constr. Co., 528 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. City of Chicago v. Kenny Constr.
Co., 426 U.S. 921 (1976). Citing Erie, the Royal court stated, "In diversity actions, state law gov-
erns." Id. at 190 n.9 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The court did not distin-
guish between state substantive and procedural law.
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bly or in bad faith, and thus the relevant conduct did not fall within
section 41.115 The defendant argued that the lower court's award of
fees was nonetheless supportable under the federal law exception to
the American Rule. That exception allows attorney's fees when an
opponent acts in an "oppressive and vexatious manner" and unneces-
sarily prolongs prosecution of the action. 116 Citing footnote 31, the
circuit court rejected the defendant's argument and concluded,
"Thus, it is to state law that the district courts must look in determin-
ing whether attorneys' fees may be awarded in a diversity case."11 7
115. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1266-67.
116. Id. at 1265 n.27. For other exceptions, see supra note 106.
117. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1265 n.27. This broad reading of footnote 31 by federal courts has
led to two unfortunate results: federal courts are not only interpreting footnote 31 as mandating
application of all state fee-shifting provisions in Erie cases, but also, as in Tryforos, they are interpret-
ing it as requiring the exclusion of federal procedural common law allowing fee-shifting. See Chi-
cago Regional Port Dist. v. Ferroslag, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (federal district
court, sitting in diversity, held that it was without power to invoke the federal bad faith exception for
awarding fees). This misconception is not unique to the Seventh Circuit. See, eg., First State Un-
derwriters Agency v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1313 (3d Cir. 1986) (employing state fee-
shifting law in diversity case for bad faith during litigation where law applied to all litigants); Perkins
State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that federal bad faith excep-
tion to American Rule does not allow fee recovery in an interpleader case unless state law also
recognizes the exception). These misreadings impinge upon the federal power to regulate procedure
in federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 153-99. Unfortunately, some federal courts in
diversity cases have failed to undertake the necessary Erie analysis to determine the applicability of
federal procedural common law, and have instead simply relied upon footnote 31 for the proposition
that where a state does not recognize a bad faith exception to the American Rule, federal courts may
not invoke any federal common law. See infra text accompanying notes 147-52. The Erie analysis,
however, reveals this reliance to be erroneous. Although application of the bad faith exception may
result in disparate treatment of a bad faith litigant in federal court and in state court, this lack of
uniformity regarding assessment of attorney's fees is unlikely to promote forum shopping. It is
improbable that a litigant would choose a federal forum in hope of recovering counsel's fees in the
remote prospect that the opponent will conduct himself in bad faith and still not fall within any
federal statute or procedural rule. Furthermore, the bad faith exception has no bearing on the out-
come of the case; it simply regulates the manner in which substantive rights may be enforced in
federal court. As well, the federal interest in deterring misconduct in federal courts through sanc-
tions, such as those imposed under the bad faith exception to the American Rule, does not conflict
with the policy of states adhering to a different rule. For a similar analysis, see id. See also Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (discussing the compatibility between federal procedural common law
designed to streamline litigation and any state substantive law designed to encourage meritorious
litigation); Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1231-32
(6th Cir. 1984) (discussing American Rule disallowing attorney's fees as part of compensation, and
federal common law bad faith exception to American Rule). See also supra notes 20-30 and accom-
panying text.
Federal courts' recognition of the applicability of the federal procedural bad faith exception to
the American Rule for state law claims, as well as for federal question claims, serves the goal of
creating certainty as to the conduct and circumstances that will trigger fee awards in federal courts.
The procedural bad faith exception derives from federal court authority "governed not by rule or
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
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The court never discussed whether the asserted federal law exception
to the American Rule was substantive or procedural. 1 8
A Florida statute illustrates a second form of state procedural
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)
(affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal of diversity case for lack of prosecution pursuant to
district court's inherent housekeeping power). See Howard v. Chris-Craft Corp., 562 F. Supp. 932,
940-41 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (although court sitting in diversity considered whether defendant's litiga-
tion conduct was in bad faith so as to warrant exercise of court's equitable power to award plaintiffs
their attorney's fees, it incorrectly applied federal bad faith exception regarding prelitigation conduct
and properly deferred to Texas statute on service, labor and other contracts).
118. Interestingly, in Chicago Regional Port Dist. v. Ferroslag, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 401 (N.D.
I1. 1982), a district court held that it was without power to award attorney's fees pursuant to the
federal bad faith exception in a diversity case. Yet in Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 556 F.
Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 738 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1984), the same court sitting in diversity
invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to assess attorney's fees against Harbil's counsel:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
This raises the question of why the court in Ferroslag held that it was without authority to
assess fees against a party via the federal common law bad faith exception, but the court in Knorr
held that it had the authority to assess fees against attorneys under a federal statute. Is the attorney/
client or statutory/common law difference important? Citing its own dicta in Ferroslag, the court in
Knorr stated that § 1927 permitted the assessment of fees against lawyers in all federal court actions.
Knorr, 556 F. Supp. at 486 n.3. The court believed there was a more compelling federal interest in
sanctioning attorney misconduct than in sanctioning party misconduct. This notion is erroneous
because federal policy is to sanction misconduct of both parties and attorneys alike. Federal Rules
11 and 26, which provide for sanctions against either parties or lawyers, are demonstrative of this
policy. See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980) (indicating that line of
"inherent power" cases suggests that clients and attorneys alike may be sanctionable for miscon-
duct).
Another possible explanation of why the district court felt it was authorized to invoke § 1927,
but not the common law bad faith exception, involves the distinct tests articulated in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The test for applying federal civil rules (and presumably federal proce-
dural law statutes) in diversity cases is whether the rules are proper subjects for federal governmental
concern (both the concern defined by statute, such as due regard for substantive rights found in 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), and the concern defined by the federal Constitution). Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-
74. The test for applying federal common law in diversity cases involves the Erie concerns for forum
shopping and uniformity. Id. at 473. See also infra text accompanying notes 142-47. Most courts
mistakenly proceed as though the Erie concerns were authoritatively addressed in footnote 31 in
Alyeska. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
The foregoing analysis suggests the advisability of harmonizing the procedural laws in rule 11,
§ 1927, and the bad faith exception by consolidating them into a unified standard, preferably set out
in federal rules. Consolidation would clarify the confusion as to when one or the other is applicable
and would better assure uniform treatment of similar process abuses. See, e.g., Parness, Groundless
Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 356-62. Guide-
lines unrelated to procedural law concerns and thus usually applicable in federal question cases




law on fee-shifting which is broader in scope and yet also deemed
applicable in an Erie setting. The state statute provides that a court
can award attorney's fees to a prevailing party when the court deter-
mines that the losing party failed to raise a justiciable issue.1 19 Unlike
the Illinois statute, the Florida statute does not require bad faith or
unreasonableness. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regarded this
statute as appropriate authority for allowing fees in the federal inter-
pleader case of Perkins State Bank v. Connolly.120 The circuit court
found, however, that the claimant could not meet the Florida statute's
strict standards and therefore did not permit any fee recovery.
Both the Illinois and Florida provisions are manifestations of
state procedural law. 121 They apply to all civil cases and are triggered
119. The Florida statute provides: "the court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid
to the prevailing party in ... any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete
absence of a justiciable issue of other law or fact raised... by the losing party." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 57.105 (West 1987). A fee-shifting statute which only applies to a certain claim would be different.
See id. § 542.22, a similar statute for antitrust claims which was used in the diversity case, Norton
Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 116 F.R.D 236 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See also supra note 98.
120. 632 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980). The court in Perkins misconstrued footnote 31 in Alyeska
in two ways. It interpreted footnote 31 to exclude application of the federal bad faith exception. Id.
at 1310. See also supra note 118. It also construed footnote 31 as requiring the effectuation of all
state attorney's fee laws regardless of the underlying public policy. Perkins, 632 F.2d at 1310-11.
The Perkins court also analyzed the applicability of footnote 31 to interpleader cases brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) as distinguished from ordinary diversity cases brought under id.
§ 1332. As articulated in Perkins, statutory interpleader and general diversity jurisdiction differ in
that the former often seeks to advance an interest which is not implicated in the latter: the protec-
tion of a bystander stakeholder, who holds funds claimed by two or more adverse parties, from
multiple liability. Perkins, 632 F.2d at 1311. Due to this federal interest, state laws which deny
uninterested stakeholders recovery of counsel's fees interfere with the purpose of § 1335 and there-
fore federal courts are not obligated to give them effect. Id. On the other hand, there is no federal
interest in granting attorney's fees to the adverse claimants in an interpleader action in an amount
different from what the claimants would have recovered in state court, and this includes the inter-
pleading party who contests the ownership of the fund or disputes the amount of his liability (i.e., an
action in the nature of interpleader), thereby becoming an adverse party himself. Id. But see Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 206 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (stakeholder usually not entitled to fees
unless fees are available in state court because no federal question is present in interpleader action).
In addition to statutory interpleader actions involving disinterested or bystander stakeholders,
another situation may arise in which a diversity case is not ordinary for purposes of footnote 31.
This can occur when federal jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diversity, but could have been
based on a federal question. In such a case, the Erie doctrine policies regarding uniformity and
forum shopping, which mandate the application of state substantive law in ordinary diversity cases,
should not require application of state substantive law. See Kalmbach, Inc. v. Insurance Co., 422 F.
Supp. 44, 45 (D. Alaska 1976) (declining to apply state law governing attorney's fees in diversity case
which could have been based on admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).
On the other hand, there is one type of claim which may not be based on diversity jurisdiction
at all, but to which footnote 31 should apply. This claim involves a federal court's pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction. See supra note 110.
121. In a separation of powers setting, however, the Florida Supreme Court has labeled FLA.
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only when litigants fail miserably in preparing or prosecuting their
claims. Their procedural nature is demonstrated by rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 122 which was significantly altered in
1983 to deter attorney and party misconduct in the presentation of
papers during civil litigation.
In addition to applying erroneously state statutes on procedure,
federal courts hearing state law claims also have mistakenly employed
state rules of civil procedure relating to attorney's fees. For example,
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, citing
footnote 31, applied Maryland Rule of Procedure 1-341123 (Maryland
STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 1987), quoted supra note 119, as substantive. In response to the argu-
ment that the statutory provision was a constitutional infringement upon the court's procedural rule
making authority, the court stated, "To the contrary, an award of attorney's fees is a matter of
substantive law properly underlying the aegis of the legislature." Whitten v. Progressive Casualty
Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1982). The court cited a number of prior Florida Supreme Court
decisions; each of these decisions, however, merely indicates that attorney's fees are not to be taxed
as costs except where authorized by contract or statute. See, eg., Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d
653, 655 (Fla. 1956). Thus, the court's citation to these authorities begs the question of whether
§ 57.105, in particular, regulates procedure. In fact, the court in Whitten went on to describe the
statute in a way suggesting its procedural character. It spoke of the legislative goals of discouraging
baseless claims, stonewall defenses and sham appeals, and of avoiding the reckless waste of judicial
resources. Whitten, 410 So. 2d at 505. As in the Erie setting, at least one court in a separation of
powers setting seemingly labeled attorney's fees laws as substantive simply because a liability was
created.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 states in part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney .... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper .... The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
For the view that rule 11 may not be wholly procedural, see Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions of Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
997 (1983).
123. Md. Rule 1-341 (quoted in Brady v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 610 F. Supp. 735, 737 (D.C.
Md. 1985)) provides:
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or de-
fending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification the court may
require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to
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Rule or rule 1-341) in Brady v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 124 That
rule granted courts discretion to assess costs and expenses, including
payment of attorney's fees, against a party or a party's attorney who
litigates in bad faith or without substantial justification. Maryland
Rule of Procedure 1-341 superseded rule 604(b),12 5 amending the lat-
ter by allowing a court to assess fees against a party's attorney as well
as the party. Although the district court was aware that the purpose
of Maryland Rule 1-341 was procedural, the court, sitting in diversity,
retroactively applied the new Maryland provision in assessing fees
against the plaintiff's attorney. 26 Plaintiff argued that application of
the new rule was a substantive matter since the rule created "a new
liability on the part of an attorney,"' 2 7 and that substantive law
should not be applied retroactively. The court held that retroactive
application of the new Maryland Rule was proper because the ques-
tion of who must pay attorney's fees was a question of procedure.
Specifically, the court stated:
When a court imposes a rule which is designed to control the conduct of
the litigation and the counsel appearing before the court, it is the opinion
of this court that such a matter is procedural .... Thus, even assuming
that imposition of attorney's fees against plaintiffs' counsel in this case is
a retrospective application of Md. R. 1-341, that rule neither creates a
new substantive right in the defendant nor deprives plaintiffs' attorney of
a right which existed previously. It affects matters governing this court's
power over counsel in a procedural way. 2 8
The Brady court's decision is troubling. Although the court held that
retroactivity was not barred because rule 1-341 was procedural, the
court apparently also deemed the rule substantive for Erie purposes as
the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.
124. 610 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1985). See also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Ramos, 357
F.2d 341, 342 (1st Cir. 1966) (applying P.R. R. Civ. P. 44.4(D) which provides: "Where a party has
been obstinate, the court shall in its judgment impose on such person the payment of a sum for
attorney's fees.").
125. Maryland Rule of Procedure 604(b) (superseded by MD. R.P. 1-341) stated:
In an action or part of an action, if the court finds that any proceeding was had (1) in bad
faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3) for purposes of delay the court shall re-
quire the moving party to pay to the adverse party the amount of the costs thereof and the
reasonable expenses incurred by the adverse party in opposing such proceeding, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
Brady, 610 F. Supp. at 737 n.2 (quoting Md. R.P. 604(b)).
126. The case was filed in 1979, went to trial in 1982, and argument on appeal was made in
April of 1984. Maryland Rule 1-341 went into effect on July 1, 1984.
127. Brady, 610 F. Supp. at 744.
128. Id.
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it applied the rule to the case. Consequently, the court held that the
rule was procedural for one purpose and substantive for another.
While this characterization is not necessarily inconsistent, as seen in
cases like City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ' 29 de-
scribed earlier, the court in Brady failed to explain why the two char-
acterizations were appropriate. Moreover, the court did not analyze
any policy considerations. The court's application of the state rule
effectively foreclosed federal courts from employing federal proce-
dural laws.
In applying footnote 31, some federal courts then are not exam-
ining the state policies underlying the various state fee-shifting provi-
sions. As the foregoing cases illustrate, this failure has resulted in
some federal courts in an Erie setting employing state, rather than
federal, procedural laws on the assessment of attorney's fees.
In addition, footnote 31 has also caused misapplications of law
outside the Erie context. For example, in a setting involving a choice
between competing state laws, some courts have interpreted footnote
31 as suggesting that the forum state must always apply another
state's fee-shifting law when the relevant cause of action originates
within that other state. In United California Bank v. THC Financial
Corp., 30 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Hawaiian
state court would follow footnote 31, and apply the California law on
attorney's fees in a case involving a claim under California law. 131 In
assuming all attorney's fees laws to be substantive, the court failed to
undertake any analysis of the substance/procedure dichotomy. In a
similar choice of state law setting, a federal district court, in Whiteside
v. New Castle Mutual Insurance Co.,' 32 assumed that the forum state
would deem all laws on attorney's fees to be procedural. The district
court reached this conclusion even though it had earlier cited footnote
31.133 In both cases, as in some diversity cases, lower courts neglected
to undertake a substance/procedure analysis.
129. 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 31-37.
130. 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
131. Id. at 1361.
132. 595 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Del. 1984).
133. Id. at I100. In ruling that fee awards are procedural in a state choice of law setting, the
court relied upon Chester v. Assiniboia Corp., 355 A.2d 880, 882 (Del. 1976) (applying Delaware
statute granting fees against insurers who lose when sued upon any policy involving property, even
though case may not have been based on claim under Delaware law). That application seems ques-
tionable under cases like Sioux County, Neb. v. National Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928), though the
Erie and choice of law settings do occasionally differ. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
The application of Delaware law was supported by the fact that the insurer was a Delaware resident.
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Failures to distinguish substance and procedure are also found
outside the Erie and choice of state law settings. For example, in En-
dress v. Brookdale Community College,134 a state court hearing a fed-
eral civil rights claim assumed that all state laws on attorney's fees
could be applied in the absence of any federal statutory law. 135 Thus,
the court incorrectly assumed that state substantive, as well as state
procedural, laws on fees might be available.136
In choosing among fee-shifting laws, courts often fail to under-
take a substance/procedure analysis. This failure is frequently caused
by a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's declarations in foot-
note 31 in Alyeska. To inquire further into the misreading of footnote
31, this Article will explore a phrase used in the footnote "substantial
policy of the state,"' 137 in more detail. This exploration will be cen-
tered around the major sources cited in footnote 31 and will further
demonstrate the miscomprehension of Supreme Court precedent.
D. Examining the Sources Used in Footnote 31
In footnote 31, the Supreme Court in Alyeska primarily relied on
three sources to support its assertion that, in a diversity case, federal
courts should usually follow state fee-shifting laws. Those sources in-
clude the following: the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v.
Plumer;138 Professor James W. Moore's treatise on federal practice; 139
and Stuart Speiser's treatise on attorney's fees. 14 A close examina-
tion of these sources reveals that the Supreme Court only intended for
federal courts to employ state substantive fee-shifting laws in an Erie
setting.
1. Hanna v. Plumer
In footnote 31, the Alyeska Court stated that the Erie principle
was consistent with its prior holding in Sioux County, Nebraska v.
National Surety Co., 41 that a federal court must enforce the state stat-
134. 144 N.J. Super. 109, 364 A.2d 1080 (1976).
135. Endress, 364 A.2d at 1101.
136. In rejecting possible application of cases on the federal equitable authority to award fees,
the state court failed to differentiate between cases involving federal substantive and federal proce-
dural law policies. Id. at 1100-01. On the federal equitable authority to award fees, see supra note
106.
137. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
138. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See infra notes 141-99.
139. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1974). See infra notes 200-36.
140. 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES (1973). See infra notes 237-73.
141. 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
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utory right of an insured to attorney's fees. 142 In support of this state-
ment the Court cited a portion of its 1965 decision in Hanna v.
Plumer. 143 This part of the Hanna decision held that choices between
state law and federal law in diversity cases should be made by refer-
ence to the twin policies of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins:144 "discour-
agement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."' 145 The Court further remarked in Hanna
that the importance of a state law to a state was a relevant factor in
determining the applicability of the state law in federal court. Essen-
tial to the question of the law's importance is the question posed in
Hanna, "important for what purpose?"'
146
The failure by federal courts hearing state law claims to give ef-
fect to state procedural fee-shifting provisions would not thwart the
twin aims of Erie. Generally, state procedural fee-shifting provisions
apply to litigants in general and are not designed to favor particular
causes or classes of litigants. Instead, the primary purpose of these
state procedural fee-shifting laws is the minimization of either frivo-
lous litigation or unreasonable litigation conduct. 147 A party would
not be likely to choose a federal forum to escape such state laws. Par-
ties do not generally contemplate that they or others will act in a
frivolous or unreasonable manner. Furthermore, in light of the sanc-
tions available under rule 11,148 coupled with section 1927149 and the
inherent authority of federal courts to impose sanctions for vexatious
conduct,150 federal courts would not provide a haven for those seeking
to avoid the consequences of state procedural fee-shifting laws. Con-
sequently, under Hanna, some state fee-shifting laws can be viewed as
promoting better practices before the state courts; their absence from
federal courts in diversity cases would not undermine any important
142. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
143. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
144. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68.
146. Id. at 468 n.9.
147. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 4. Some state procedural fee-shifting laws are, how-
ever, geared to particular causes and litigants, but nevertheless seek to deter unwarranted litigation
conduct. These laws often are based on findings that the particular causes and litigants are especially
susceptible to litigation misconduct. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, §§ 2-611.1, 2-622 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987) (medical malpractice cases). See also supra note 98. But see Parness, Frivolous
Pleadings in Illinois: Observations on the 1985 Medical Malpractice Reforms, 74 ILL. B.J. 238, 239
(1986) (questioning factual findings about medical malpractice claims in Illinois).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, quoted supra note 122.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982), quoted supra note 118.
150. See supra note 106.
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purpose, particularly since federal courts can employ federal fee-shift-
ing laws that promote better federal court practices.
On the other hand, differences in state and federal fee-shifting
provisions which are unrelated to litigation conduct may prompt a
party to favor a federal forum. Some state fee-shifting provisions tend
to benefit a specific class of litigants and contain no requirement that
the opposing party act unreasonably or otherwise misbehave during
litigation. The provision in Sioux County, Nebraska v. National
Surety Co. 151 is such a state law. There, the Nebraska statute required
courts to make insurance companies pay the attorney's fees of an in-
sured forced to bring suit to recover its insurance. Fee recovery was
not available to the insurance company in the event it successfully
defended a suit.152 Therefore, the statute was pro-plaintiff. More im-
portantly, the statute did not contain a requirement that the insurance
company act unreasonably during litigation. Thus, the statute fa-
vored one party over the other. Since there is no comparable federal
law concerning an insured's rights, an insurer otherwise subject to the
Nebraska statute might prefer to litigate in a federal court. Conse-
quently, to promote the substantive policy of Nebraska dealing with
the relationships between insureds and their insurers prior to any liti-
gation, and to assure the equal treatment of all insureds governed by
Nebraska law, federal courts had to apply this Nebraska statute. As a
result, the Supreme Court's decision to enforce the Nebraska statute
in Sioux County is consistent with the policies of Erie and Hanna, and
does not necessarily suggest that application of all state fee-shifting
provisions is compelled in an Erie setting. Indeed, a recent Supreme
Court decision which occurred after Alyeska and Hanna suggests
otherwise.
In the diversity case of Burlington Northern Railroad v.
Woods,153 the Supreme Court considered the applicability of an Ala-
bama statute 54 which required a state appellate court, upon affirming
a monetary judgment, to assess a penalty equal to ten percent of the
judgment against an appellant who had executed a bond in order to
stay the judgment. 155 The purposes of the statute were to penalize
defendants who brought appeals that were frivolous or initiated for
151. 276 U.S. 238, 242 n.2 (1928) (citing NEB. COMP. STAT. § 7811 (1922)). See also supra
text accompanying notes 45-49.
152. See Sioux County, 276 U.S. at 242 n.2.
153. 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987).
154. ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986).
155. Burlington, 107 S.Ct. at 969. The Alabama statute provides in part:
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the purpose of delay, 1 56 as well as to compensate prevailing complain-
ants for the additional burden of defending valid judgments. 157 The
Court also considered Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38158
(rule 38) which granted federal appellate courts the discretion to
award an appellee damages and costs when the court found that the
appeal was frivolous. 159 The objectives of rule 38 were to afford jus-
tice to the appellee through compensation and to punish the
appellant. 160
The Supreme Court, in Burlington, perceived a conflict between
the mandatory state statute and the discretionary federal appellate
rule. 161 Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Marshall found the
guidelines for choosing between conflicting federal and state laws in
Hanna v. Plumer162 The guidelines necessitated a determination of
whether the federal rule was of such breadth that it directly collided
with the state law, or whether in the absence of a clash, the federal
rule so controlled the issue that it precluded any operation of state
law. 163 If there was an affirmative answer to either question, then a
federal court had to apply the federal rule as long as it was valid.164
Of course, a court can only apply a valid federal rule. The test of
a federal rule's validity lies within the federal Constitution. Specifi-
cally, Article 111,165 supplemented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article 1,166 grants Congress the authority to ordain and
establish the federal court system. Implicit in this grant of authority
is the congressional power to enact rules of procedure governing liti-
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether debt or dam-
ages, and the same has been stayed on appeal by the execution of bond, with surety, if the
appellate court affirms the judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment against
all or any obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed judgment, 10 percent dam-
ages thereon and the costs of the appellate court ....
ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986).
156. Burlington, 107 S.Ct. at 969 (citing Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. v. Thombs,
204 Ala. 678, 87 So. 205, 211 (1920)).
157. Id. (citing City of Birmingham v. Bowen, 254 Ala. 41, 47 So. 2d 174, 179-80 (1950)).
158. FED. R. App. P. 38 provides: "If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."
159. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 969.
160. Id. (citing FED. R. App. P. 38 advisory committee's notes).
161. Id. at 970.
162. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
163. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 969 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 &
750 n.9 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72).
164. Id. at 969-70 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74).
165. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
166. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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gation in any federal court.167 Congress can delegate this power, and
it has done so, through the Rules Enabling Act. 168 A test of a federal
rule's validity may include an inquiry into whether an exercise of the
rulemaking power is constitutional. 169 Rules that are unquestionably
procedural are necessarily constitutional.170  In addition, rules regu-
lating matters that fall within the gray area between substance and
procedure and thus can reasonably be classified as either, also meet
the test of constitutionality.71 Although the Rules Enabling Act fur-
ther requires that a court-made rule not "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right," 172 rules that incidentally affect litigants' sub-
stantive rights do not violate this requirement or the Constitution.173
In Burlington, the Supreme Court noted that rule 38 gave federal
appellate courts the discretion to assess "just damages" as a means of
punishing those responsible for frivolous appeals and of compensating
the appellees for the expense and delay resulting from defending the
appealed judgment. 174 The Court found that this authority to exercise
discretion clashed with the mandatory character of the Alabama stat-
ute.175 Furthermore, the Court determined that the objectives of rule
38 were "sufficiently coextensive" with the objectives of the state stat-
ute and "that the Rule occupie[d] the statute's field of operation so as
to preclude its application in federal diversity cases." 176 In addition
to rule 38, the Court observed that another federal rule also occupied
the Alabama statute's "field of operation."1 77 That rule was Federal
167. See Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 969 n.3.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) provides in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall pre-
serve the right of trial by jury at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. ...
169. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 970.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
173. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 970 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 970-71.
177. Id. at 971.
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Rule of Appellate Procedure 37178 (rule 37) and it provided post-judg-
ment interest for an appellee who successfully defended a judgment
on appeal. This second rule compensated the appellee for his inability
to use the judgment proceeds during the period the judgment was
stayed pending appeal. 179 Consequently, the Court held that rule 37
was also coextensive with the compensatory purpose of the Alabama
statute. 180
Having discerned a conflict between federal procedural law and
the state statute on assessments against some unsuccessful appellants,
the Burlington Court then examined the validity of rule 38. The
Court deemed the rule constitutionally valid because the matters
which it regulated could "reasonably be classified as procedural."' 181
In addition, the Court found that the rule was within the ambit of
rulemaking authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act because its
discretionary procedure did not impair any litigant's substantive
rights, but only affected the process of enforcing those rights.
8 2
Given the validity of rule 38, the Court concluded that the Alabama
statute mandating a ten percent assessment against an unsuccessful
appellant had no application in an Erie setting.
183
The relationship between rule 38 and the Alabama statute in
Burlington is similar to the relationship between certain federal rules
on fee-shifting and comparable state laws and rules on fee-shifting.
For example, rule 11 allows shifting of attorney's fees in situations in
which a federal court finds that litigation papers are unreasonable,
unsupportable or otherwise improper.' 84 Burlington, whose holding
178. FED. R. App. P. 37 provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed,
whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date the judgment was en-
tered in the district court. If a judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a
judgment for money be entered in the district court, the mandate shall contain instructions
with respect to allowance of interest.
179. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 971 n.5.




184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, quoted supra note 122. Although many states have adopted rule
11 into their codes or rules of conduct, see supra note 3, a significant number of states retain more
restrictions on judicial power to sanction those responsible for groundless papers than exist in cur-
rent rule I 1 (many continuing with the more limited power under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). Com-
pare, e.g., Border City Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St. 3d 65, 472 N.E.2d 350 (1984); Daily
Gazette Co. v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2011 (West
Supp. 1987), S.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
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strongly suggests that not all state fee-shifting provisions are applica-
ble in federal courts, guides the application of the Hanna test for
resolving conflicts between rule 11 and different state laws.
Although rule 11 requires district courts to sanction violations of
the signature requirement, like rule 38, it provides that the type of
sanction imposed is left to judicial discretion. 185 A state procedural
law which mandates an assessment of attorney's fees or some other
remedy as the sanction state courts must impose for violations of the
signature requirement may collide with a federal court's discretion to
impose an appropriate sanction. In addition, the breadth of rule 11,
which establishes standards for all litigation papers and recognizes
judicial authority to sanction violations of these standards, may con-
trol the issue of sanctioning this form of litigation misconduct, leaving
no room for the operation of state laws. Finally, perhaps fee-shifting
laws, like rule 11, are not meant to have application outside the judi-
cial system whose government created the laws. This is because these
laws are typically geared to deterrence of litigation misconduct in cer-
tain courts and not to compensation, though compensation is often a
means of promoting deterrence.
Regarding the control of questions relating to litigation papers in
trial courts, rule 11 is at least as broad as the federal rules in Burling-
ton governing appeals. In Burlington, the Court found that rule 38
had the dual purpose of penalizing appellants pursuing frivolous ap-
peals and compensating appellees for resulting injuries. 186 Because
the purposes of rule 38, together with the compensatory goals of rule
37,187 were sufficiently coextensive with the purposes of the Alabama
statute, the Court held that the federal rules precluded application of
the state law in diversity cases. 188 An examination of the purposes of
rule 11 reveals that the rule is similarly coextensive with state proce-
dural fee-shifting laws dealing with litigation papers. Like the puni-
tive objective of rule 38, one purpose of rule 11 is to encourage the
"detection and punishment" of violations of the rule's signature re-
quirement. 189 Also, like the compensatory purposes of rules 38 and
37, an objective of rule 11 is "to award expenses, including attorney's
185. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 971.
186. Id. at 970-71.
187. FED. R. App. P. 37, quoted supra note 178.
188. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 970-71.
189. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90
F.R.D. 451, 461 (1981) (FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3) advisory committee's note) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft], recognized in 90 F.R.D. at 465 (FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note).
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fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or
conducting litigation." 190 Finally, rule 11 emphasizes "a deterrent
orientation in dealing with improper pleading."1 91 In light of these
multiple objectives, rule 11 seemingly occupies a field of operation so
that state fee-shifting provisions primarily designed to deal with im-
proper papers during litigation have no place in federal court practice.
In addition, like rule 38, rule 11 "regulates matters which can
reasonably be classified as procedural," 192 and thus rule 11 is within
the limits of the Rules Enabling Act. This is because the recognition
of a discretionary authority regarding the type of sanction necessary
for any rule 11 violation "affects only the process of enforcing rights
and not the rights themselves."1 93 Although the application of rule 11
to the preclusion of a state fee-shifting provision in an Erie setting
may "incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights," 194 the constitu-
tional or statutory validity of the rule is clear in light of its essential
role in promoting the integrity of the judicial process.
Consequently, the discretionary authority under rule 11 to shift
attorney's fees in order to punish, compensate, and deter certain
forms of litigation misconduct suggests that the rule occupies the field
of operation of state fee-shifting provisions geared toward regulating
comparable litigation conduct. Coupled with the recognition of the
rule's validity, this leads to the conclusion that, under Hanna v.
Plumer,195 some state fee-shifting provisions are not applicable in an
Erie setting. Like the decisions in Sioux County, Nebraska v. National
Surety Co. 196 and Burlington, Hanna contemplates that Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins 197 requires federal courts hearing state law claims to util-
ize simultaneously federal procedural fee-shifting laws and state sub-
stantive fee-shifting laws. Such utilization is similar to the
determination in Marek v. Chesny 198 that federal courts can, and
must, simultaneously employ federal procedural and federal substan-
tive fee-shifting laws in a federal court action involving federal law
190. 90 F.D.R. at 463 (FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note).
191. Id. at 465 (FED. R. Civ. P. ll advisory committee's note).
192. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 971.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 970. But see Burbank, supra note 122 (suggesting rule 11 may not be wholly
procedural).
195. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
196. 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
197. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
198. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
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claims. 199 Accordingly, federal courts cannot interpret the reference
to Hanna in footnote 31 as mandating the enforcement of all state fee-
shifting laws in an Erie setting.
2. Moore's Federal Practice
The next authority that the Supreme Court relied on in footnote
31 was a treatise by Professor James W. Moore.200 In his treatise,
Moore stated that in "an ordinary diversity case where the state law
does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court...
state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right thereto,
which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed. '201
Although Moore did not define "substantial policy of the state," a
close examination of his analysis reveals that Moore used this term to
denote only state fee-shifting laws that can be deemed substantive
under Erie and its progeny. Moore reached his conclusion by analyz-
ing cases in which federal courts had applied state fee-shifting laws.
First, he examined cases in which federal courts enforced state laws
that denied fee awards. Then, he examined cases in which federal
courts enforced state laws that allowed fee awards. All of the cases
that Professor Moore analyzed dealt with state laws that were sub-
stantive in the Erie sense. Consequently, Moore must have used the
phrase "substantial policy of the state" to denote state substantive fee-
shifting laws in the Erie context as this Article will demonstrate in the
next two subsections.
a. State Laws Denying Fees
Moore first cited Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v.
Southeast Arkansas Levee District20 2 to support the proposition that
courts in an Erie setting should enforce state laws that deny attorney's
fees awards.20 3 In Mercantile-Commerce Bank, a federal circuit court
reviewed an Arkansas law that voided provisions in promissory notes
which stipulated attorney's fees would be paid to the payee in the
event of a lawsuit. The court applied the state law and thus disal-
199. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
200. See 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139.
201. Id. 54.77[2, at 1712-13 (cited in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421
U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975)).
202. 106 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1939).
203. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1712 n.23 (2d ed. 1981) (this Article assumes
that the supporting cases in the 1974 edition of Federal Practice cited by the Supreme Court and the
1981 edition of Federal Practice are comparable).
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lowed attorney's fees for the foreclosure of a mortgage. In its analy-
sis, the court found the "substantial policy of the state" underlying
the Arkansas law in Boozer v. Anderson.204 In Boozer, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas viewed a similar stipulation in a promissory note
as an agreement for a penalty. The Boozer court noted that courts of
equity do not favor penalties and concluded that whenever a court
can accurately measure an injury that resulted from a breach of con-
tract, "the parties will not be allowed to stipulate for a greater
amount. '205 Specifically, it held, "[W]hen a debtor pays the debt,
with interest for its detention and costs of suit, he ought not be
mulcted in a further sum."'20 6 Thus, substantive contract law embod-
ied the "substantial policy of the state. ' 20 7 The purpose of the Arkan-
sas law was to confine a promisor's liability for breach of contract to
certain forms of compensation.
However, while Arkansas contract law precluded fees, other Ar-
kansas substantive law decisions allowed them. The federal court, in
Mercantile-Commerce Bank, found that certain Arkansas Supreme
Court decisions allowed compensation to trustees and their attorneys
for performance of the trustee's essential duties--devotion "to ques-
tions affecting the substantial preservation of the trust estate and the
beneficial interest of all concerned. ' 208 Deciding that the purpose of
the law was to allocate fairly the cost of preserving a trust among
those who benefit from such preservation, the court followed these
decisions and charged against the trust the counsel fees incurred in
the protection of the trust.
The next case noted by Moore which involved a state law deny-
ing fees was Trust Co. v. National Surety Corp. 209 In that case, a fed-
eral circuit court followed Illinois law, declared in Patterson v.
Northern Trust Co.,210 which stated that costs could "be recovered
only in cases where there is statutory authority therefor. ' ' 211 Since the
plaintiffs in Trust Co. could not bring themselves within a statutory
204. 42 Ark. 167 (1883) (cited in Mercantile-Commerce Bank, 106 F.2d at 970).
205. Id. at 169.
206. Id.
207. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
208. Mercantile-Commerce Bank, 106 F.2d at 972.
209. 177 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1949).
210. 286 Il1. 564, 122 N.E. 55 (1919).
211. Trust Co., 177 F.2d at 819. The court said, "The rule is also well established that attorney
fees and the ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowable to the successful party in
the absence of a statute, or in the absence of some agreement or stipulation specially authorizing the
allowance thereof .... Id.
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provision, the court denied attorney's fees.212
Illinois law, in Trust Co., reflected the American Rule that a liti-
gant must pay his own attorney's fees in the absence of statutory au-
thorization, court rule or contractual provision. 213 As applied, this
rule contains substantive as well as procedural laws. A major purpose
in some applications of the rule is to prevent a chilling effect upon
those who otherwise would vindicate their rights through the court
system.214 However, the rule is often excepted, such as by section
1988,215 in order to promote the enforcement of certain substantive
rights. Another form of exception involves assessment of fees against
litigants who act in bad faith or otherwise improperly during litiga-
tion, thereby causing a drain on the adjudicatory system as well as on
their opponents. This form of exception usually is aimed at deterring
procedural law misconduct regardless of the substantive rights in-
volved. In Trust Co., only the substantive law exceptions to the
American Rule were implicated, as the court did not indicate any
concern for litigation misconduct. Consequently, the federal court in
Trust Co. properly applied the state substantive law.
Finally, as authority for the proposition that federal courts under
Erie should apply state laws denying attorney's fees when such laws
reflect a substantial state policy, Moore relied on Republic of China v.
Central Scientific Co. 216 Interestingly, the court in that case heavily
relied on an earlier edition of Moore's treatise and interpreted the
treatise to indicate that a federal court must apply the substantive
state policy on attorney's fees in an Erie setting.217 In Republic of
China, the district court looked to an Illinois law that prohibited at-
torney's fees from being assessed as costs, and concluded that it had
to deny attorney's fees.218 Hence, in discussing in his treatise state
law which "reflects a substantial policy of the state, '219 Moore cited a
212. Id. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed a com-
parable state policy in the diversity case of United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 185
F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950). This case was also cited by Moore in his treatise section relied on by the
Supreme Court in Alyeska. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1712 n.23 (2d ed. 1981). The
circuit court in United Pacific reversed the district court's allowance of attorney's fees to an insured,
observing that no Utah statute or contractual provision was applicable. United Pacific, 185 F.2d at
448.
213. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 12:3, at 463-64.
214. Id. § 12:3, at 467.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (discussed supra note 19).
216. 120 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Il. 1954).
217. Id. at 925 (citing 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, at 1347, 1352 (2d ed. 1938)).
218. Id.
219. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1712-13 (2d ed. 1981).
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
case in which the court applied a state law that "discloses a 'substan-
tive' policy" 220 (in reliance on Moore's own earlier treatise). These
cases all suggest, then, that in endorsing the application of state attor-
ney's fee provisions in an Erie setting, Moore was referring to substan-
tive laws which reflect significant state policy, as opposed to all state
laws, substantive and procedural, which embody significant policies of
the state.
b. State Laws Allowing Fees
In moving from an examination of state laws which deny recov-
ery of attorney's fees to state laws which allow such recovery, Moore
first cited Sioux County, Nebraska v. National Surety Co. 221 as an in-
stance in which a federal court sitting in diversity applied a state stat-
ute allowing attorney's fees to the prevailing party.222 As previously
noted, the Nebraska statute in Sioux County was aimed at aiding
those entitled to benefits under an insurance policy to vindicate their
rights. To achieve this goal, the statute imposed a liability upon the
recalcitrant insurer for payment of the insured's attorney's fees. This
liability was an incident of the insurer's wrongful refusal to meet its
contractual obligation prior to litigation and, consequently, the stat-
ute was substantive.
223
In Gandall v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,224 also cited by Moore,225 a
220. Id.
221. 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
222. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, t 54.77[2J, at 1713 n.24 (2d ed. 1981).
223. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. Like the Nebraska statute in Sioux
County, the Florida statute enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Anderson's Groves, Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1949) (cited in 6 J. MOORE,
supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1713 n.24 (2d ed. 1981)) provided for an allowance of attorney's fees to
a beneficiary who successfully brings suit under an insurance policy. In Phoenix, an insurance com-
pany brought suit for a declaratory judgment against the insured. Dissenting in part, Judge Hutche-
son stated that the majority, by allowing the insured to recover its attorney's fees, had misapplied the
Florida statute. Id. at 248 (Hutcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Hutche-
son drew a distinction between a situation where an insured brings suit against an insurer who
wrongfully refuses to pay, and a situation in which the insurer simply seeks from the court a declara-
tion and instructions as to what it should do. Id. at 249. Judge Hutcheson reasoned that Florida
courts would not apply the statute in such circumstances since Florida courts view the law as retrib-
utive in nature and as "designed to compel insurers to abide by their contracts without... wrongful
litigation." Id. Judge Hutcheson's conclusion can be harmonized with the view expressed by Judge
Strum in Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 392 (S.D. Fla. 1931). See
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Since the liability imposed by the statute is an incident of
the insurer's wrongful conduct outside of litigation, it may be that in the absence of wrongful con-
duct, no liability should exist.
224. 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
225. See 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1713 n.24 (2d ed. 1981).
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federal district court sitting in diversity followed a Wisconsin statute
which provided for the taxation of guardian ad litem fees as costs
against an unsuccessful defendant. 226 The district court quoted
Moore's treatise and stated, "'In an action involving a non-federal
matter state law should... normally be followed where the state law
reflects a "substantive" policy relative to non-conventional items of ex-
pense, such as attorney's fees.'"227 Next, the Gandall district court
quoted from the portion of Moore's treatise used in footnote 31 in
Alyeska and said:
"But in an ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run
counter to a valid federal statute or rule, and usually it will not, state law
denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right thereto, which re-
flects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed."
228
The Gandall court concluded that the Wisconsin statute expressed a
state policy which should have been followed regardless of whether
the statute was typed substantive or procedural. 229 Thus, the court in
Gandall found that a necessary criteria for applying a state provision
regarding the shifting of attorney's fees is that the provision must do
more than regulate procedure-federal courts will follow state laws
which are "the kind expressive of a substantive state policy.
'230
Finally,231 Moore relied on Reynolds v. Wade232 to support his
226. Gandall, 158 F. Supp. at 881.
227. Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77, at 1346-47
(2d ed. 1938), now found in 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[1], at 1701-02 (2d ed. 1987)).
228. Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77, at 1354-55
(2d ed. 1938), now found in 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1712-13 (2d ed. 1987)).
229. Id. at 882 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949)). For a
discussion of Cohen, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. The label attached to a statute by
a state is not dispositive as to its characterization in an Erie setting because, for instance, the state
may embody some of its substantive law for Erie purposes in what it calls its Code or Rules of Civil
Procedure. Such an embodiment should not be troublesome unless substantive law is found in a
procedural rule adopted by a body (such as a court) which is limited to promulgating procedural
laws. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (court's rules cannot enlarge or modify substantive rights).
Compare infra note 235.
230. Gandall, 158 F. Supp. at 882. The district court, in Gandall, dispelled the defendant's
argument that a federal court, even in a diversity case, was precluded from taxing any costs not
mentioned in the federal statutes. The court cited McDaniel v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 221 F.2d
171 (7th Cir. 1955), in which the court in a diversity case applied Illinois law regarding attorney's
fees. Gandall, 158 F. Supp. at 882. The Illinois statute applied in McDaniel permitted recovery of
attorney's fees as a cost where the insurance company refused to pay the loss "vexatious[ly] and
without reasonable cause." McDaniel, 221 F.2d at 173. The state law applied is founded upon a
substantive state policy involving regulation of an insurance company's prelitigation activity, and its
use by the federal court in McDaniel was correct.
231. Moore next cited two cases, Empire State Ins. Co. v. Chafetz, 302 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.
1962) and Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 155 (D. Del. 1965). 6 J. MOORE,
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proposition that federal courts under Erie should apply state laws al-
lowing attorney's fees when these laws reflect a substantial policy of
the state.233 In Reynolds, a federal court, sitting in diversity, followed
an Alaska statute which provided:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
agreement, expressed or implied, of the parties: but there may be allowed
to the prevailing party in the judgment certain sums by way of indemnity
for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or defense thereto, which
allowances are termed costs.
2 34
Although the allowance of attorney's fees is not directed toward a
specific type of litigant such as an insured, and is not designed to aid
the vindication of a specific right or cause of action, the underlying
policy, to indemnify the prevailing party, can be viewed as substantive
in an Erie setting. Unlike rule 11, whose primary goal is deterrence,
the primary purpose of the Alaska statute is compensation. 235 Even
supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1713 n.24 (2d ed. 1981). In Chafetsy and Henlopen, federal courts
applied state statutes mandating the allowance of attorney's fees to a beneficiary under an insurance
contract where judgment is rendered against the insurer. These statutes clearly embody substantive
state law and, as such, should be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity.
232. 140 F. Supp. 713 (D. Alaska 1956), rev'd, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957).
233. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 139, 54.77[2], at 1713 n.24 (2d ed. 1981).
234. Reynolds, 140 F. Supp. at 715 (quoting A.C.L.A. 1949 § 55-11-51).
235. A.C.L.A. 1949 § 55-11-51 has been repealed, and the area it covered is now contained in
ALASKA Civ. R. 54(d), 82, promulgated pursuant to ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (Supp. 1987):
The supreme court shall determine by rule or order the costs, if any that may be allowed a
prevailing party in a civil action. Unless specifically authorized by statute or by agreement
between the parties, attorney's fees may not be awarded to a party in a civil action for
personal injury, death or property damage related to or arising out of fault, as defined in
A.S. 09.17.900, unless the civil action is contested without trial or fully contested as deter-
mined by the court.
Because the policies underlying § 55-11-51 are now, in part, embodied in Alaska Civil Rule 82, the
stated purpose of rule 82 is indicative of the purpose of the former statute applied in Reynolds. In
McDonough v. Lee, 420 P.2d 459 (Alaska 1966), Justice Rabinowitz of the Supreme Court of
Alaska stated:
The purpose of Civil Rule 82 in providing for the allowance of attorney's fees is to partially
compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which he has been put in the litigation in
which he was involved. The rule was not designed to be used capriciously or arbitrarily, or
as a vehicle for accomplishing any purpose other than providing compensation where it is
justified.
Id. at 465 (emphasis added) (quoting Preferred Gen. Agency v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska
1964)). Thus, the major purpose of rule 82 seemingly is to provide some indemnification to the
prevailing party, and not to punish a losing party for any litigation misconduct or to deter meritless
litigation. Although the rule is labelled procedural and was promulgated by the Alaska Supreme
Court, the attorney's fee provision embodies a substantive policy of compensation and therefore may
properly be enforced by federal courts in an Erie setting. If any problem does arise, it is one of
separation of powers in that substantive laws are not usually found within procedural rules. How-
ever, promulgation of rule 82 appears to be within the authority granted the state supreme court, as
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though the compensation statute has a tendency to deter meritless
litigation, this deterrence is ancillary to the statutory goal of compen-
sating a prevailing party for the costs of litigation. The statute applies
regardless of the litigation conduct of any party or lawyer, and conse-
quently, courts view it as substantive.
236
Accordingly, the sources cited by Moore in support of his pro-
positions quoted by the Supreme Court in footnote 31 in Alyeska, are
diversity cases in which the federal courts applied substantive state
law on attorney's fees. Thus, his treatise lends no support to the prop-
osition that the Supreme Court, in footnote 31, intended for federal
courts hearing state law claims to apply all forms of state fee-shifting
laws.
3. Speiser's Attorneys' Fees
Following the quote from Moore's Federal Practice, the Supreme
Court in Alyeska in footnote 31 cited Stuart Speiser's treatise on attor-
ney's fees. 237  The section in the treatise mentioned by the Court
begins:
In diversity actions, with the exception of the federal statute gov-
erning attorneys' docket fees, the federal courts, in the absence of coun-
tervailing equitable principles, apply state law with regard to the
allowance or disallowance of attorneys' fees, whether the state law is
(1) state statutory law governing the allowance or disallowance of attor-
neys' fees; (2) state statutory or nonstatutory law as to the validity or
construction of contractual provisions for attorneys' fees; or (3) state
nonstatutory law governing the allowance or disallowance of attorneys'
fees in the absence of contract. 238
the enabling statute, ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (Supp. 1987), does not expressly limit the court's
power to the promulgation of attorney's fees rules which are based on procedural law objectives.
Compare ALASKA Civ. R. 82 with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
promulgated by U.S. Supreme Court may not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right).
236. By comparison, while Federal Rule 11 also provides compensation in the form of an
award of attorney's fees, its primary purpose is deterrence of litigation misconduct. Preliminary
Draft, supra note 189, 90 F.D.R. at 465 (FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note).
237. 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, §§ 14:3, 14:4, at 10-12 (cited in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975)).
238. Id. § 14:3, at 10 (footnotes omitted). Speiser cited a number of cases in which federal
courts, in the absence of countervailing equitable principles, have followed state law on attorney's
fees. See, eg., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Smart, 293 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1961) (attor-
ney's fees awarded to insured pursuant to Kansas statute mandating such allowance in all actions
where insured prevails on policy insuring against loss by fire, tornado, lightning or hail); Stokes v.
Reeves, 245 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1957) (erroneously concluding that any state law claim for attorney's
fees is to be treated as substantive for Erie purposes, but correctly applying Texas law allowing fees
for claimants in actions for value of services rendered); Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co. v.
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Although Speiser did not expressly distinguish between state substan-
tive and state procedural laws on attorney's fees, he qualified his ini-
tial statement with the following sentence: "Thus state statutes
allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees in special classes of actions
have frequently been given effect in suits brought in federal courts. '2 39
This statement indicates that federal courts do not apply all state fee-
Rotherum, 218 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying Texas statute involved in Stokes); Lone Star
Producing Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 208 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Tex. 1962) (same), rev'd, 322 F.2d 28 (5th
Cir. 1963); Foy v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Fla. 1955) (attorney's fees awarded
to insured pursuant to Florida statute requiring that judgment in favor of insured against insurer
include reasonable compensation to insured's attorney).
To illustrate an instance in which a federal court did not follow state law regarding attorney's
fees because of the presence of "countervailing equitable principles," Speiser cited Forest Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (federal court disregarded state
law which followed American Rule and held that breach of confidence and improper use of plain-
tiff's trade secrets prior to litigation was sufficient to justify awarding plaintiff attorney's fees as part
of damages under equitable principles), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Forest Laboratories,
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971). While Forest illustrates the general point made
by Speiser, the court's decision was wrong, as the court in an Erie setting employed its equity power
to create substantive federal law inappropriate under Erie. State law clearly should have governed
the liabilities flowing from the prelitigation conduct giving rise to the civil action. A better illustra-
tion of a case in which federal courts utilized countervailing equitable principles is Howard v. Chris-
Craft Corp., 562 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (application of federal procedural common law
founded on a policy of minimizing bad faith litigation activities).
In reference to state nonstatutory laws governing the allowance of attorney's fees, Speiser cited
Craven v. Shoults, 97 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1938), in which a federal court upheld an award of attor-
ney's fees to a party who successfully defended the validity of a will. The Craven court examined the
state policy underlying the state nonstatutory fee-shifting law and concluded that the law was based
on a substantive policy of allowing the successful litigant's attorney's fees to be paid out of the estate
so as to fairly spread the cost among those who have benefited, as well as on a policy of encouraging
legatees to assert claims.
Speiser pointed to a few cases in which federal courts denied attorney's fees on the ground that
the law of the state in which the federal court sat did not apply under the circumstances. See
Miller's Nat'l Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 102 (10th Cir. 1958)
(construing Kansas statute authorizing award of attorney's fees in cases which involve loss "by fire,
tornado, lightning or hail" as inapplicable where explosion caused the loss, even though the policy
insured against loss by fire); Blum v. William Goldman Theatres, Inc., 164 F.2d 192, 198 (3d Cir.
1947) (adhering to general rule of Pennsylvania that each party is usually required to pay his own
counsel fees, and noting that the purpose of the rule is that otherwise "clients would pay liberally out
of the pockets of their adversaries." (quoting Alexander v. Herr's Exr's, 11 Pa. 537, 539 (1849)));
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Dorough, 107 F. 389 (C.C.A. Tex. 1901) (holding that Texas statute
requiring life or health insurance companies to pay attorney's fees of insured when company fails to
pay following a loss did not apply to accident insurance companies because state statute should be
strictly construed and was penal in character because it denied one class of suitors the right to
contest its rights or liabilities under contract).
239. 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:3, at 10-11 (emphasis added). To support this qualify-
ing statement, Speiser cited Whitson v. Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp., 385 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1967), in
which the court allowed attorney's fees in an enforcement proceeding pursuant to Arkansas contract
law. Thus, the "special class of actions" in Whitson was a proceeding to enforce a contract, and the
state law given effect by the federal court, contract law, was substantive, not procedural, under Erie.
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shifting laws, and is consistent with the notion that federal courts
should apply only substantive fee-shifting laws. In another section of
his treatise, also cited by the Supreme Court in footnote 3 l,240 Speiser
lists the kinds of state fee-shifting statutes federal courts have fre-
quently applied; each one is based on a state law policy which is sub-
stantive under Erie.
In describing the types of state fee-shifting laws applied by fed-
eral courts, Speiser declared that the kind most frequently followed
involves beneficiaries who seek to recover attorney's fees from insur-
ance companies with whom they litigate.241 Fidelity Mutual Life As-
sociation v. Mettler242 illustrates the substantive character of this type
of fee provision. In this case, the Supreme Court stated that in enact-
ing a statute which provided that life and health insurance companies
who defaulted in payment of their policies would be liable for reason-
able attorney's fees, the Texas legislature evidently contemplated "the
necessity of the prompt payment of the insurance money in very many
cases in order to provide the means of living of which the beneficiaries
had been deprived by the death of the insured. ' 243 Clearly, the law
transcends the regulation of court procedure since it is based on a
policy of providing for the well-being of beneficiaries who have lost
their means of support. The law discourages insurance companies
from withholding payments on policies even if there may be some
legitimate reason. Consequently, the law is substantive in an Erie
setting.
A second type of fee statute noted by Speiser as applied by fed-
eral courts involves the rights of a county board of supervisors to re-
cover counsel fees from a depository that delayed in paying county
funds when lawfully demanded. In National Surety Co. v. LeFlore
County, Mississippi,244 the circuit court applied a Mississippi stat-
ute,245 which compelled a depository who delayed in transferring
county funds to pay the county its collection expenses, including at-
torney's fees, as well as to pay damages of one percent per month for
the delay. The statute further provided that "the bond of any deposi-
240. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
241. 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12.
242. 185 U.S. 308 (1902). Mettler was first in a string of cases cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note
140, § 14:4, at 12 n.39.
243. Mettler, 185 U.S. at 327.
244. 262 F. 325 (C.C. Miss. 1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 490 (1920). National Surety was the
sole case cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.41.
245. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-105-329 (1972) (current version).
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tory shall be liable for said expenses and damages. ' 246 In considering
the liability of the depository's surety for the depository's failure to
account for county funds, the court held:
[T]he statute imposes damages by way of penalty for delay and counsel
fees for collection primarily only upon the depository, and not upon the
surety. The defaults punished by the statute are those of the depository
alone by the very terms of the statute, and the damages and counsel fees
are imposed upon the depository, and it alone.247
The court added, "The terms of the statute.., enter into the contract
between the county and the depository." 248 This reasoning is analo-
gous to that found in Judge Strum's opinion in Orlando Candy Co. v.
Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. 249 Orlando dealt with a statute that
imposed liability for payment of an insured's attorney's fees upon a
recalcitrant insurer. In Orlando, the court noted that the parties con-
tracted, subject to the terms of the statute, and the statute thereby
became a part of the contract.2 50 The court characterized liability im-
posed by the statute as "an incident to the insurer's wrongful refusal
to pay, not a mere procedural incident to entry of judgment. '251
Likewise, in National Surety, the liability imposed by the Mississippi
statute was an incident to the depository's wrongful withholding of
county funds.252 The statute did not seek to regulate litigation con-
duct, but rather to impact upon the relationship between a county and
a depository of county funds by imposing fees and penalties upon the
depository for default in its obligations. Consequently, like the state
statute in Orlando, the state statute in National Surety was substantive
for Erie purposes.
Another type of state fee-shifting law recognized by Speiser, as
applicable in federal courts, concerns an award of attorney's fees in
suits involving claims for services rendered or materials furnished. In
both Zweig v. Bethlehem Supply Co. 253 and Crescent Lumber & Shin-
gle Co. v. Rotherum,254 a federal circuit court applied such a stat-
246. Id.
247. National Surety, 262 F. at 330.
248. Id.
249. 51 F.2d 392 (S.D. Fla. 1931). See supra notes 51-55.
250. Orlando, 51 F.2d at 393.
251. Id.
252. National Surety, 262 F.2d at 330.
253. 186 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1951) (cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.42).
254. 218 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1955) (cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.42).
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ute.255 Neither case makes any reference to the policy rationale(s)
underlying the law. However, the nature of this statute may be char-
acterized as substantive under Erie, because the purpose relates to full
compensation for a certain class of litigants regardless of their litiga-
tion activities.
Other types of state statutes employed by federal courts hearing
state law claims which were noted by Speiser include those allowing
attorney's fees in suits for violations of state securities laws. For ex-
ample, in Associated Manufacturers Corp. v. De jong,25 6 a federal cir-
cuit court upheld an attorney's fee award pursuant to an Iowa
statute.25 7 The statute provided that a sale or contract for sale of se-
curities made in violation of an Iowa Blue Sky law was voidable at the
purchaser's election and that the seller was liable to the purchaser for
the full amount paid, together with costs and reasonable attorney's
fees. The De Jong court did not discuss the policy underlying the
statute. However, the purpose of this type of statute must be to pro-
tect more fully the purchaser.258 The law is substantive under Erie
because its purpose is to effectuate the state's Blue Sky laws which are
designed "as a means of affording protection to the investing public
from the nefarious practices of none too scrupulous brokers and deal-
ers in securities. ' 259
According to Speiser, federal courts have also applied state stat-
utes providing recovery of attorney's fees in suits brought to compel
release of a mineral lease. Although the federal circuit court, in Stan-
255. The current version of the statute is codified at TEx. Civ. PRAc. & RaM. § 38.001
(Vernon 1986):
A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corporation, in




(4) freight or express overcharges;
(5) lost or damaged freight or express;
(6) killed or injured stock;
(7) a sworn account; or
(8) an oral or written contract.
256. 64 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1933) (cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.43).
257. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.23 (West 1946), repealed by Acts 1975 (66 G.A.) ch. 235,
§ 621.
258. Comment, Blue Sky Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REv. 102, 114 (1937-1938) (noting that the
purpose of statutes which void contracts made in violation of Blue Sky laws is to protect the
purchaser).
259. Id. at 103.
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olind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen,260 did not discuss the policy under-
lying the Montana Statute,261 the Supreme Court of Montana has
described the statute's predecessor as "remedial in its operation. ' 262
The Supreme Court of Montana further stated, "[I]t is merely a rem-
edy afforded for the enforcement of private contracts. ' 263 Conse-
quently, the statute is substantive under Erie. Finally, Speiser noted
that federal courts have applied state fee-shifting laws for libel suits.
To illustrate, Speiser cited Kellems v. California, CIO Council.264 In
that case, a federal district court followed a California statute265 man-
dating an award of $100 to cover the attorney's fees of the successful
party in a libel suit. A California court of appeals discussed the state
policy underlying this statute in Hills v. Shaffer,266 and remarked that
although such an allowance might appear to be a penalty, "the mani-
fest object of the provision is to reimburse a defendant for the expen-
diture he has been put to in the employment of an attorney to defend
the action. '267 In Hills, the court noted that the provision on fees was
accompanied by a provision requiring a written undertaking on the
plaintiff's part in the sum of $500 to help insure that the defendant
could recover monies awarded from the plaintiff to cover costs,
charges and attorney's fees incurred prior to dismissal of the action.
In this setting, a court may interpret the statute as an attempt to cause
a decrease in the number of libel claims and thus as an attempt to
deter those seeking to chill the exercise of free speech rights.268
Viewed in this way, the statute is unconnected to any procedural law
260. 100 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1938) (cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.44).
261. See Stanolind, 100 F.2d at 302 n.4 for discussion of the Montana statute.
262. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 73 Mont. 94, 235 P. 761, 765 (1925).
263. Solberg, 235 P. at 765.
264. 6 F.R.D. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1946) (cited in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.45).
265. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1037 (West 1980), repealed by Stats. 1986, c. 377, § 17, which
provided:
If the plaintiff recovers judgment in an action for libel or slander, the plaintiff shall be
allowed as costs one hundred dollars ($100) to cover counsel fees in addition to the other
costs. If the action is dismissed or the defendant recovers judgment, the defendant shall be
allowed one hundred dollars ($100) to cover counsel fees in addition to other costs, and
judgment shall be entered accordingly.
266. 96 Cal. App. 520, 274 P. 388 (1929).
267. Hills, 274 P. at 389-90.
268. While the statute's directive that prevailing plaintiffs in libel or slander cases shall be
allowed $100 to cover counsel fees seemingly promoted the commencement of such cases, the bond
requirement indicated legislative suspicions about the validity of many libel cases. Compare this
with the security requirement for derivative actions in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337




goals, particularly as it requires the assessment of fees regardless of
the reasonableness of conduct during litigation.
269
Accordingly, the sources employed by Speiser in support of the
statements quoted in footnote 31 are diversity cases in which federal
courts applied substantive state laws on attorney's fees.270 Conse-
quently, his work does not support the proposition that the Alyeska
Supreme Court, in footnote 31, intended for federal courts hearing
state law claims to apply all forms of state fee-shifting laws.
The foregoing analyses demonstrate that the decision in Hanna v.
Plumer,271 as well as the works of Moore and Speiser, compel an in-
terpretation of the words "state law ... which reflects a substantial
policy of the state" 272 in footnote 31 to encompass only state substan-
tive fee-shifting laws. These analyses, together with the recent
269. In Kellems v. California, CIO Council, 6 F.R.D. 358, 361 (N.D. Cal. 1946), the court, in
an Erie setting, characterized the California law as substantive. The court's characterization is sus-
tainable, but its conclusion that a federal procedural rule can limit the enforcement of a state sub-
stantive right seems wrong under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), which requires
that civil procedure rules not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights.
270. Speiser did note one federal court's enforcement of a state fee-shifting statute allowing
garnishees to recover counsel's fees. New York Fin. Co. v. Potter, 126 F. 432 (C.C. Pa. 1903) (cited
in 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 140, § 14:4, at 12 n.40). In Potter, a federal court followed a now-
obsolete Pennsylvania statute which provided:
Where, in any attachment execution.... the garnishee... shall be found to have.., no
real or personal property of the defendant, nor to owe him any debt, other than such
property or debts as shall have been already admitted by the plea or answers of the gar-
nishee, or in case, without going to trial, the plaintiff shall take judgment against the gar-
nishee for what shall be so admitted in his plea or answer, then and in either such case, the
garnishee shall be entitled, in addition to the costs already allowed by law, to a reasonable
counsel fee out of the property in his or their hands ....
Id. at 433. The court discerned the character of the provision when it stated:
The legislative intent,... was to concede to the plaintiff in an attachment the right either
to accept what upon the answers it might be entitled to take, or to proceed for the purpose
of establishing its right to something more, but subject, in the latter event, to the conse-
quence that, if it should fail to establish its greater claim, the fund actually recoverable
would be chargeable with the expense incurred by the garnishee in the employment of
counsel to defend against the plaintiff's excessive demand.
Id. The Pennsylvania statute seemingly is comparable to Federal Rule 68 and thus may be proce-
dural under the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). See supra
text accompanying note 30. Both the act and the rule provide incentives to accept offers made when
there is a dispute, yet the act governs only attachment executions while the rule governs all civil
actions. Use of the act by the federal court may, however, be sustainable because the case occurred
long before Erie and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus involved a state
statute which the court may have felt obliged to apply regardless of its character. See Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (local state legislative enactments binding on federal courts under Rules of
Decision Act, now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
271. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See supra notes 141-99.
272. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
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Supreme Court decision in Marek v. Chesny,273 suggest that in an Erie
setting, federal courts should apply state substantive fee-shifting laws
and federal procedural fee-shifting laws, and that federal courts are
not bound to apply state procedural fee-shifting laws.
CONCLUSION
Fee-shifting laws may be either substantive or procedural,
whether in an Erie setting, a choice of law setting, or a separation of
powers setting. In the Erie setting, one in which federal courts enter-
tain state law claims while pretending they are state courts, federal
courts have failed to appreciate the substance/procedure dichotomy
in assessing state laws on the recovery of attorney's fees. The failure
springs, in significant part, from a misunderstanding of Supreme
Court precedents, particularly the dicta in footnote 31 in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.274 As the continuing expan-
sion of fee-shifting laws proceeds (with, perhaps, the exceptions swal-
lowing the rule), it is time for courts to recognize the substantive and
procedural characteristics of these laws and their significance when
courts must make choices about laws and their lawmakers.
In making choices, the cases in the Erie setting suggest some
guidelines. While these guidelines may be generally employed in all
three settings, the results may occasionally vary from setting to set-
ting.275 These guidelines indicate that a fee-shifting law related to the
conduct giving rise to a cause of action is more typically substantive,
while a fee-shifting law related to the conduct occurring during the
course of litigation is more typically procedural. Further, they indi-
cate that fee-shifting laws germane to acts commencing a cause of
action or causing such a commencement may be either substantive or
procedural, depending upon their purpose: a law which seeks to en-
courage or discourage the assertion of certain types of claims is usu-
ally substantive, while a law which seeks to deter the assertion of
frivolous claims or defenses is normally procedural.
273. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
274. 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
275. See L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 249-265 (1986). See also City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 404 F.2d 1052
(8th Cir. 1979) (because statute on attorney's fees is characterized as substantive for Erie purposes
does not mean it is similarly characterized for choice of state law purposes); Stokes v. Reeves, 245
F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1957) (same).
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